

*History*  
*of the*  
*Individual Mobilization*  
*Augmentee Program*

**an Air Reserve Personnel Center  
History Office Special Study  
Lowry AFB, Colorado**



*History of the  
Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program*



*Air Reserve Personnel Center*

*Special Study*

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# Part One: Origin of IMA Program

The present Air Force Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program grew out of the Army Air Forces' first attempts to train individual reservists in the period between World War II and the Korean War. By definition, an IMA is a Selected Reservist assigned to an active force organization to provide additional manpower immediately following a declaration of war or national emergency. Individual reservists conduct their service lives outside the comfortable family of unit reservists and often must take the initiative in arranging their participation and training. Today, more than 13,000 reservists serve in the IMA program.

The IMA program is complex and multifaceted. Throughout its history, there has always been some question as to whether it was a Reserve or active force program. Should the active force define the requirements, recruit, and train the resources? Or, since it is a program consisting of reservists, should it be designed and regulated within the organizational structure of the Air Force Reserve? The history of the IMA program has been fraught with years of painstaking reviews and inspections, both from within the Air Force and without, all attempting to resolve this and many other relevant issues.

Today, organizational responsibilities for the IMA program extend intricately over both the active force and reserve structure. HQ USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DP) is responsible for overall program management. The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) provides overall administrative management and organizational support with personnel policy guidance from the Office of Air Force Reserve (USAF/RE). Individual reservists in the legal, chaplain, and medical areas are centrally managed at ARPC but are attached and trained at active duty organizations. Reservists in the intelligence specialties are managed within the organizational structures of the Air Force Intelligence Agency and Electronic Security Command. Many major commands (MAJCOMs), separate operating agencies (SOAs), and even agencies external to the Air Force, have direct responsibilities for IMAs assigned, attached and trained within their organizations. The evolutionary process of this unique program began in the late forties.

## Army Air Forces' Plan for the Air Reserve

Immediately following World War II, leaders in the Army Air Forces (AAF), as well as members of other military services, were greatly concerned about staying militarily prepared. As early as July 1946, the "Army Air Forces' Plan for the Air Reserve" was approved, which provided for training of both organized reserve units and individual reservists. This plan functioned as a base

or starting point for the Air Reserve Forces from July 1946 to October 1948.<sup>1</sup>

The necessity to train individual reservists was an integral part of this plan. References were made to "those individuals and units sufficient in numbers and type which will, together with the Regular Army Air Forces.... constitute an overall balanced Army Air Forces of 1,500,000." Again, "Air Reserve training will be unit and individual proficiency training..." Specifically, the Plan defined these individual members of the Active Air Reserve as

Additional trained, commissioned and enlisted personnel with military experience, available for assignments, to augment units of the Regular Army Air Forces, Air Units of the National Guard, and the Air Reserve. It is recognized that refresher training may be required to qualify personnel of this category (of the Active Air Reserve) for specific assignments.

Individual training objectives were to "develop and qualify individuals for their contemplated duties in the event of an emergency" and to "discover, develop, and qualify officers with special abilities to assume technical, staff, or command responsibilities".

Specific individual reserve programs, such as an IMA program, were not defined in the original plan. (Only unit program composition and organization were described.) How individual training occurred was left to Lt General George E. Stratemeyer, commander of the Air Defense Command (ADC).


## Lt General George E. Stratemeyer,

Champion of IMA Program

Air Force planners perceived a centralized form of management and organization and gave sole responsibility for the development of an air reserve to ADC, under General Stratemeyer, with headquarters at Mitchell Field, NY. In ADC's Air Reserve Plan (Second Edition), dated 5 September 1946, General Stratemeyer's ideas for carrying out the provisions of the Army Air Forces Plan for the Air Reserve were outlined.

The plan called for the establishment of 130 Air Reserve Training Detachments at selected bases of ADC's six numbered Air Forces, varying in strength from eight to 200 reservists who were assigned to an Army Air Force Base Unit for Reserve Training (AAFBU(RT)) and who were responsible for management and training of units and individuals assigned to them. Each detachment was assigned a servicing base, although the detachment was not necessarily located on that base. Forty additional Regular Army installations were to be available

## 1946 AIR FORCE RESERVE ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



for training reservists under other MAJCOMs (AU, SAC, TAC, Proving Ground Command and ATC); however, all training activities were under the direction of General Stratemeyer. Approximately 640 air reserve units were to be eventually organized and trained by personnel of the Air Reserve Training Detachments. *For training of individual reservists, 1,200 composite units were to be established.*

All 130 detachments were to be open by 1 June 1947. By 1 October 1946, 40 detachments were officially running. By February 1947, 70 detachments were in existence, but owing to a reduction in funds, that number was reduced in the same month to 41.<sup>2</sup> [See organizational chart above for details].

By April of the same year (1947), General Stratemeyer implemented the first individual mobilization assignee effort. He instructed his numbered Air Force commanders and headquarters staff to assign reservists to key ADC command positions and allow for their training with the ultimate goal of having these individuals available and fully familiar with their immediate assignments in case of general mobilization.

General Stratemeyer became a staunch and vocal advocate of this experimental training program. In November 1947, in a speech given to the Air Reserve Association annual convention in Oklahoma City, General Stratemeyer defined the mobilization assignment process he developed:

To the air reservist who is qualified and in a position to devote slightly more time to the program than the average air reservist, we are offering a special type of training. This is known as a mobilization assignment. It consists of an assignment to a regular air force operation unit of an air force headquarters echelon or higher, as an understudy of a full-time regular Air Force officer or enlisted man

in a standard position in the unit's organization. In this position, the individual contributes part-time duty whenever he finds it convenient. He also is called for two weeks' tour of active duty, to be served in the headquarters to which he is assigned, if he so desires. This frequent and close working with a specific group makes these air reservists most valuable. Should an emergency occur, we would be able to expand our staffs immediately with the addition of trained personnel already cognizant of our general operating procedures and methods. I have authorized the increase of my staff to the extent of 50 percent by appointment of selected air reserve officers and enlisted men to positions in my own headquarters. Reports from several of my division chiefs reveal the outstanding success that has been achieved during the past months, since this program has been in operation. Not only have the division chiefs been impressed by the quality of the work performed and the frequency of visits by these mobilization assignees, but the air reservists themselves have been enthusiastic in their comments regarding their assignments, the duties assigned to them and the cooperation displayed by their co-workers in the regular establishment. Although these mobilization assignments have been limited to Air Force headquarters and similar or higher echelons, we may expand this mobilization assignment program at such future time until our TO&E units assigned to the detachments are completely staffed.

In December 1947 (just two months after the Air Force became an independent military service), the first official definition of an IMA was published. ADC Regu-



lation 35-26, entitled, Military Mobilization Assignments for Air Reserve Personnel, was distributed with the definition of this new type of reserve assignment: "A mobilization assignment is the assignment of an individual reservist to the position which he will fill when called to extended active duty in the event of a national emergency."

Several of the major commands, especially Tactical Air Command (TAC), followed General Stratemeyer's lead and offered a modicum of training to individual reservists. However, at an ADC conference in December 1947, some other major commands expressed reluctance to take on more training activities. At that conference, General Stratemeyer expressed his viewpoint that

All elements of the Air Force must train individual reservists for specific mobilization duties, and a letter must be sent from the Air Force Chief of Staff to all MAJCOMs directing commanders to augment the M-day strength of their respective units by procuring during peacetime broadly experienced personnel of outstanding executive, administrative and technical abilities whose civilian occupational specialty is such as would fit them for an important staff, executive or technical position in a wartime Air Force. Such personnel must be found, interested in Air Force activities, commissioned in the Air Force Reserve (when not already commissioned,) and given a mobilization assignment to a specific duty for which he is best fitted.

Some major command representatives, on hearing General Stratemeyer's remarks, agreed in concept that this individual training program would succeed only if every element of the Air Force participated, but because of the priorities of their primary missions, they were reluctant to take on individual reserve training unless told to do so by the Chief of Staff. That mandate was issued the following month.<sup>3</sup>

In January 1948, the major commands received a directive from the Chief of Staff, General Carl A. Spaatz, amending major air command missions to incorporate specific reserve training responsibilities. At the same time, the Air Staff published a directive on the assignment, administration, and training of individual reservists at bases where no reserve units were located. The guidance authorized unit and base commanders to assign qualified reservists to mobilization positions. This directive allowed commanders to determine the number of reservists they could accommodate based on their abilities to train them without regard to specific mobilization requirements.<sup>4</sup>

### Endorsement of Gray Committee

The following summer (in June 1948), the individual mobilization assignee program received more emphasis

when the Secretary of Defense received a report entitled "Reserve Forces for National Security" from the Committee on Civilian Components, chaired by Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of the Army. Included, among other things, was a definition of the mobilization assignee process and an endorsement of its immediate implementation.

These individuals [not assigned to units] are required as replacements for early combat losses...many of them will be among the first required and are as vital to mobilization as members of units... Required numbers of such personnel can be determined by experience... The Air Force plans to pre-assign individuals to operational units...to training units, to headquarters and staffs, to replacement training centers and to individual assignments...these plans should be carried out as completely as possible.

Even amidst the confusion and uncertainty of those early years, when there was a lack of funds, equipment, and support for any air reserve program, the individual mobilization assignee program seemed, from several sources, to be considered a viable and needed training program.<sup>5</sup>

### Air Force 1948 Revision of "AAF Plan for the Air Reserve"

With the new, independent Air Force's adoption of the Fiscal Year 1950 Reserve Program, the individual mobilization assignee program became an integral training program for a ready reserve. On October 15, 1948, hoping to encourage a more rapid growth of a strong Reserve program, President Truman directed the Secretary of Defense to recruit, organize and train reservists without delay. Two Air Force actions followed for the purpose of better enforcing this directive.

The first action was the revision of the "Army Air Forces' Plan for the Air Reserves." The new program (which eventually became known as the Fiscal Year 1950 Reserve Program) divided reservists into two general categories: the Organized Air Reserve trained in a) the mobilization assignment program, b) the Air Force Reserve Training Center program, c) the Corollary Unit program, and d) the extension course program. This Organized Air Reserve was to contain some 77,500 individuals who represented the most urgent Air Force requirements on M-Day with the highest degree of training. The second category, the Volunteer Air Reserve, included only the Volunteer Air Reserve Training (VART) program, which was the first major effort to train large numbers of individual reservists not considered essential on M-Day. (Note: Members of the VART program were assigned to Air Reserve groups and squadrons and were managed by reservists themselves. Active duty liaison personnel advised the commanders

and assisted with administrative matters. The training consisted primarily of lectures appropriate to Air Force specialties, supplemented by occasional seminars, field trips, and specialty courses available at nearby colleges or military installations. The results of the VART program were poor because of lack of equipment and training materials. It was discontinued in 1954.)

The second action taken to enforce the presidential directive was the establishment of Continental Air Command (ConAC) in December 1948, absorbing ADC responsibilities with respect to the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. (The newly formed command was also responsible for air defense of the U.S., for tactical air support of the ground forces, and for a large number of other functions and programs.) The Command operated through six numbered Air Forces organized on a territorial basis. In addition, the headquarters of both ADC and TAC, which had been merged to form ConAC, were retained within the ConAC structure as planning and operational headquarters. General Stratemyer was ConAC's first commander.<sup>6</sup>

This revision contained one major departure from previous Reserve program planning which was to greatly affect the individual mobilization assignee program – all major commands were to become more directly involved in the management of the mobilization assignment and corollary unit programs. Regular Air Force funds, facilities, supplies, and equipment were to be used for these two programs with the exception that the following were chargeable to USAFR funds: 1) inactive duty training pay, 2) active duty training pay and travel, 3) subsistence for airmen while undergoing active duty training, 4) individual clothing and equipment, and 5) hospitalization while undergoing active duty training

or incurred as a result of active duty training.<sup>7</sup> ConAC was responsible only for the two remaining programs of the Organized Air Reserve - the Air Reserve Training Centers and the extension course programs. All activities of the Volunteer Air Reserve were the responsibility of ConAC.

### Effects of Korean War on IMA Program

In spite of an environment of a lack of concern and support, both in funding and in equipment, General Stratemyer was able to establish the foundation of a viable Air Reserve. His individual mobilization assignee program, especially, withstood the scrutiny of many Air Force and congressional review boards and became a permanent entity of the Air Force Reserve program. However, in April 1949, planning and organizational improvement attempts took two severe blows. General Stratemyer was transferred to the Pacific to command the Far East Air Forces, and in June, the Korean War broke out. The newly created mobilization assignee program lost its greatest advocate, and the Korean conflict decimated the ranks of the reserve programs General Stratemyer fought so hard to strengthen.

ConAC's organizational structure and mission were also severely affected by the outbreak of the war. The Air Force reestablished TAC as a major air command on 1 December 1950 and transferred ConAC's tactical and troop carrier units and bases to that command. A month later, ADC was revived and restored to major command status, separating air defense from the ConAC mission. ConAC's six regional air forces were regrouped into four (First, Fourth, Tenth and Fourteenth) and the domain of each adjusted accordingly.<sup>8</sup>

## Part Two: Air Reserve Centers 1951-1961

Air Force leaders were not pleased with the overall mobilization of reservists for the Korean conflict. The mobilization of more than 141,000 air reservists in 1950 revealed a lack of firm mobilization planning and resulted in inefficient use of the Air Force Reserve, which caused the Air Force to take a serious look at its reserve programs.<sup>9</sup> Twice during the war years, the Air Force called for a review of the Air Reserve programs. Both reviews agreed that, in an attempt to better train and prepare reservists for mobilization, organization of Air Reserve Training Centers was necessary. These centers were approved in 1951, taking the place of the earlier organized detachments, and lasted until their recommended demise in 1961.

### HQ USAF Air Reserve Planning Board

In April 1951, the first such review group convened. The Air Reserve Planning Board at HQ USAF was charged with re-evaluating the entire reserve program to determine size, composition and organization of an Air Force Reserve. The board was to determine an effective administrative structure and training program and to delineate the relationship of the reserve to the regular forces. This board's recommendations were never implemented because of being over-shadowed by another reserve plan developed not even three months later by a second group called the "Smith Committee." However, there were important recommendations worth noting in the final report. It was recommended that ConAC be responsible for selected reserve programs and that other major commands be responsible for training and administering their mobilization assignee and unit programs. Again, a more decentralized form of management structure was being suggested with more active force involvement in management functions. The board also recommended reserve districts be created to supervise and coordinate the administration, training, and supply of the reserve in defined geographic areas as opposed to detachments, and that training centers, located in highly populated areas, be added to the training structure.<sup>10</sup>

### Smith Committee, June 1951

As mentioned above, in June 1951, the Air Force established a second committee chaired by Robert J. Smith, an Air Force Reserve general officer and special consultant to the Air Force, to develop a realistic, long-range plan for the Air Reserve Forces related and responsible to defined Air Force requirements.<sup>11</sup> The committee's final report was not that far removed from the Planning Board's review. The committee recommended 30 flying training centers (called centers instead of the

earlier term of detachments) to support 30 reserve flying wings. Only 17 of these training centers were to be located on ConAC bases; the 13 remaining centers were to be tenants on other major command bases. These centers would be located in metropolitan areas rather than rural areas because of the availability of reservists. The Air Force approved the Smith Committee's recommended plan on 9 August 1951, and Lt General Leon W. Johnson, ConAC Commander, began implementation.

Under this reorganization, ConAC continued to be responsible for overall administration of reserve programs and for a certain aspect of training responsibilities, e.g., the preparation of all annual training schedules, etc. However, active duty field training responsibilities of both units and individuals were dispersed among the major commands to which units or individuals were assigned under mobilization plans. For unit programs, major command training responsibilities included the development of operational training curricula, procedures and training standards. The same training responsibilities for individual reserve programs were given to ATC, which was to furnish such training aids to ConAC for implementation and supervision. This overall organizational structure was, according to the Smith Committee, to provide a "clean-cut command type structure" resulting in unity and clarity of control. However, as years of decentralization proved, especially for the IMA program, results were quite the opposite. The IMA program, throughout its history, was plagued with reviews and examinations, nearly all of which expressed concern about fragmented management – a persistent, unsolved aspect of the program.

ConAC also functioned as the central source of personnel data and information and was to maintain the master files of reservists. In turn, ConAC established Detachment 1, the Air Reserve Records Center (ARRC), in Denver, Colorado, in November 1953, to accomplish the centralization of reserve master files. ARRC was to play an integral role in the individual reserve programs, specifically the IMA program, beginning soon after its establishment.

Under this new plan, implemented by General Johnson, the reserve categories were defined in a slightly different manner. The committee divided the reserve into the Ready Reserve (available for immediate recall on orders of the president), the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The individual mobilization assignee program remained one aspect of the Ready Reserve for training individual reservists.

### Air Reserve Centers Established

One of General Johnson's first actions was to consoli-

date districts, detachments, etc. into "Air Reserve Centers" based on the Smith Committee's recommendations. An Air Reserve Center (ARC) was defined as a "Regular Air Force table of distribution unit which was provided with the personnel, facilities, and equipment required to administer, train, and support members of attached reserve units" and individual reservists as well. By the end of June 1956, 79 centers were in existence, which rose to a peak total of 93 centers in June 1957. The elimination of eleven centers in July 1958 as a result of economic measures reduced the total to 82. Further reductions occurred throughout 1959 and 1960, and all Air Reserve Centers were eliminated by September 1961).

From April 1954 until 1957, the ARC program operated with success and popularity. Recruiting was a comparatively simple matter. A specialized training course was open to any reservist in the corresponding Air Force specialty if he met time-in-grade, physical, and availability requirements. Even if he were in a pay status, he did not have to be assigned to a specific mobilization position. In June 1956, at its highest point, 26,807 paid reservists and 33,115 non-paid reservists

participated in the various programs. (See Table One for ARC manpower strengths, 1956-1961). Three types of training were offered at these centers: general, professional and specialized. General training provided general military education, emphasizing orientation in Air Force policies and procedures, and consisted of staff exercises, lectures, films and field trips. Professional training was uniquely designed for such critical professions as physicians, lawyers and public relations experts. Because there was no need for classroom instruction or schooling in their fields, such reservists participated in practical projects, and in some cases, attended general training sessions. These professionals were organized into professional flights. Specialized training was tailored to the reservist's military specialty, such as operations or administration.

The ARC training program was not a new system of training. It was the epitome of the pre-World War II theory of maintaining a large pool of reservists who underwent general training, the majority of whom would have to be specifically trained after mobilization and, consequently, would not be necessarily available immediately upon mobilization. Individual reservists were also a part of this manpower pool but were not directly assigned to specific mobilization positions or trained in specific roles or functions to be immediately available in time of war or national emergency.

**TABLE ONE:  
Air Reserve Center Manpower Strengths  
(1956-1961)**

Date	Number and Type of Unit	Reserve Individuals	
		Paid	Non-Paid
June 1956	79 ARCs	26,807	33,115
	118 Air Reserve Gps		
	591 Air Reserve Sqs		
June 1957	93 ARCs	35,990	22,323
	118 Air Reserve Gps		
	584 Air Reserve Sqs		
June 1958	16 Air Reserve Training Wings	31,313	20,646
	93 ARCs		
	116 Air Reserve Gps 564 Air Reserve Sqs		
June 1959	16 Air Reserve Training Wings	29,242	17,502
	82 ARCs		
	109 Air Reserve Gps 498 Air Reserve Sqs		
June 1960	16 Air Force Reserve Sectors	27,668	17,502
	82 ARCs		
	107 Air Reserve Gps 478 Air Reserve Sqs		
June 1961	16 Air Force Reserve Sectors	32,391	12,101
	82 ARCs		
	107 Air Reserve Gps 466 Air Reserve Sqs		

### Emergence of Match-Merge Theory

There was opposition, in the late fifties, to this popular theory of maintaining a large pool of reservists for general training. Some members of the Air Force leadership expressed the belief in June 1956 that the training for these thousands of reservists was not controlled on a realistic basis, which resulted in a situation where countless individuals were receiving training and pay when they actually were not required in the event of mobilization. This premise was an outgrowth of legislation passed in 1952 known as the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended by the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. This legislation required that each service screen its ready reserve forces to ensure that such forces were in fact "ready and immediately available" for active duty should a national emergency arise and to insure a proper balance of military skills. According to Colonel Carroll S. Geddes, Chief of Activities Group, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ USAF, in order to comply with this directive, the Air Force com-

piled a wartime requirements plan – the Reserve Forces Personnel War Requirement. Specifically, this plan was the total known or anticipated personnel requirement for units and individuals in excess of peacetime active force personnel authorization, to be manned by Reserve personnel in the event of war or national emergency. After screening the Ready Reserve, using the wartime requirements plan as a basis, the Air Force found there was an excess of reservists in some skill areas and a shortage of reservists in several critical skill areas.<sup>12</sup>

To resolve the situation, this group of Air Force planners devised an option reminiscent of General Stratemeyer's earlier individual mobilization assignee program prior to the Korean War. They asserted that a "mobilization alignment" needed to be instigated to align, by grade and skill, all reservists against specific positions required in the mobilization wartime plan. In order to comply with the law, this option seemed the only obvious recourse. Those reservists for whom there was no requirement were to be eliminated from reserve training, possibly by reassigning them to the Non-affiliated Reserve Section (NARS) or reassigning them to a reserve program where they could at least participate for points only. This option became known as the "Match-Merge Policy" or program for the reconciliation of mobilization requirements.<sup>13</sup>

The initial timetable called for completion of the alignment by 15 August 1956 – an unrealistic and impossible deadline to meet for such an enormous and complicated project. In reality, match-merge would remain an on-going process for several years, but the initial phase was completed by the end of 1957.

The ARRC in Denver, an organization that had been in existence only two years at the time of this directive, played an integral role in the reconciliation of mobilization requirements. The Center was chosen because it was no longer a mere repository for reservists' records. Its mission and resultant responsibilities had broadened a great deal. Specifically, ARRC was responsible for maintaining the capability of calling to active duty the Air Reserve in the event of total mobilization or national emergency; maintaining and reporting to higher headquarters statistics regarding distribution of the total strength of the Air Reserve; accomplishing Air Reserve procurement, assignments, promotions, and separations; determining reserve classification and the extent of individual participation; and maintaining master and field personnel records of all Air Force reservists with the exception of retired reservists and general officers. It was the likely organizational element of ConAC to accomplish the Match-Merge process.<sup>14</sup>

The matching process occurred in two phases: one phase lasted from mid-August 1956 until 31 December 1956 and was based on the Reserve Forces Personnel War Requirement for fiscal year 1957; the second phase began in February 1957 and was based on the Reserve

Forces Personnel War Requirement for fiscal year 1958/59 and ended 31 December 1957. However, as mentioned above, this matching process continued to be an on-going process. According to the wartime requirement for fiscal year 1957, approximately 100,000 positions (26,920 officer and 67,331 enlisted) in the general reserve mobilization requirement outside the category A units) needed to be matched with reservists in training. (According to the War Requirement, approximately 314,000 officers and airmen were necessary to man both unit and individual reserve positions.)

Air Staff gave MAJCOMs the responsibility for aligning their own assigned mobilization assignees and reporting overages and vacancies to ARRC. The Center reviewed all records for reservists that MAJCOMs assigned and cut orders on those reservists if the assignment was appropriate. ARRC reassigned overages to other MAJCOM requirements and attempted to fill MAJCOM vacancies using the "selective assignee" process. The selective involuntary assignment process was implemented in the mid-fifties. The Air Force estimated that approximately 140,000 obligated officers and airmen would be released from active duty during 1956. This annual rate was estimated to remain constant for several years. Under the provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, it was the duty of each eight-year obligor to participate satisfactorily in an organized unit of a Reserve component or officer training program. Many of these obligors possessed skills and grades that corresponded to reserve vacancies as defined in the wartime requirement. Since voluntary recruitment failed to provide sufficient personnel to meet authorized strengths and specialties needed, the selective involuntary assignment program was developed to fill these positions involuntarily. This assignment procedure selected, by grade, skill, and availability code, qualified obligors for assignment to vacancies for such grades and skills.

The Center received the initial reports from MAJCOMs between September and November 1956 and by 31 December, matched approximately 20,000 reservists against positions in the mobilization requirement. (An additional criterion for the assignment process was that, whenever possible, individuals were to be so located that they would be able to report promptly to their wartime duty stations, even if transportation facilities became disrupted. Of the 11,052 aligned officers, 93.5 percent were aligned to MAJCOM units geographically located in the same numbered air force as were their present units of assignment, and 51.5 percent were aligned with units in the same state as that in which they were currently assigned. Of the 9,497 enlisted members who were aligned, 92.3 percent were aligned to units of the same numbered air force as were their current assignments, and 58.3 percent were aligned with units in the same state as that of their current assignments.<sup>15</sup>

After 31 December 1956, ARRC did not go any further to align reservists with mobilization positions based on the fiscal year 1957 war plan in anticipation of receiving the new reserve mobilization requirement in early 1957. No orders were cut on the reservists already assigned, and the selective assignee process was not used to fill vacancies for the same reason.

In February 1957, the revised Reserve Forces Personnel War Requirement for fiscal years 1958-59 (WPR 58/59) was published. In this plan, new terminology for Reserve positions was introduced. The required reserve positions were divided into three groups referred to as follows (These were positions other than those organized as Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve category A units).<sup>16</sup>

Part I – that portion of the WPR 58/59 allotted to MAJCOMs for individuals procured and trained by the MAJCOM concerned.

Part II – that portion of the WPR 58/59 allotted to MAJCOMs for individuals assigned to the MAJCOMs but receiving inactive duty training in the Air Reserve Centers of ConAC.

Part III – General Reserve War Requirement for Individuals. That portion of the WPR 58/59 was determined as the individual attritional/replacement requirement for the Air Force. These individuals were assigned to ConAC and received inactive duty training in the ARCs subject to funding and training capabilities.

Strength requirements in WPR 58/59 were as follows:

	Officers	Airmen	Total
Part I	12,725	11,490	24,215
Part II	13,375	54,925	68,300
Part III	15,762	36,690	52,452
Totals	41,862	103,105	144,967

Again, as during the first alignment, the MAJCOMs aligned their assigned individual reservists to Part I augmentation spaces allotted them and, by 11 March 1957, all MAJCOMs had reported overages and shortages to ARRC. By 31 December 1957, 10,297 volunteers were assigned to Part I mobilization positions and 5,866 volunteers were assigned to Part II and III positions. After voluntary assignment activities, ARRC resorted to involuntary selective assignments. By 31 December 1957, 12,816 reservists were selectively assigned to Part I mobilization positions, and 72,144 members were selectively assigned to Part II and III positions. (During this process, if any volunteer or reservist selectively chosen qualified for a category A unit or Air National Guard unit, that unit received first priority on assigning that member to a unit vacancy.)

By 31 December 1957, almost 120,000 required mobilization spaces in the WPR 58/59 (for Parts I, II, and III) had reservists assigned against them. The remaining vacancies per category within all the Air Reserve forces were as follows:

58/59	Vacancies left in Air Reserve Forces Based on WPR on 31 December 1957		
	Officers	Enlisted	Total
Part I	6,307	4,546	10,853
Part II	3,510	7,130	10,640
Part III	5,057	2,412	7,469
Total Vacancies	14,874	14,088	28,962

The difficult and complicated process of match-merge continued over the next three to four years.<sup>17</sup>

### Impact of Match-Merge Policy

The match-merge policy, being in direct opposition to the traditional practice of maintaining a large pool of reservists undergoing general training, created much controversy. Reservists from all over the country, when hearing of this program, expressed concern and alarm that they might be cut from pay status positions. Due to the process' very nature, it did have a harsh effect upon reservists, especially those considered as Part II participants in ARCs. Often, from the reservist's point of view, there seemed to be no rhyme or reason to the process of matching as the MAJCOMs continually changed their requirements. The process was so dynamic that even officials in ConAC headquarters and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces had difficulty in keeping up with the status of the alignment.<sup>18</sup>

ConAC's role in the management structure of the individual reserve programs was severely curtailed by the implementation of the Match-Merge policy. Over 60 percent of the individual reservists were either assigned to MAJCOMs and received all their training at their MAJCOMs or were assigned to MAJCOMs but attached to ConAC's ARCs for training only. ConAC's authority to order reservists to active duty in time of war or national emergency had already been rescinded in May 1956 by a Secretary of the Air Force directive. That authority was given to commanders of gaining commands. (Another blow to ConAC came two years later in 1959 with the implementation of recommendations from the Maj General Sory Smith Committee.)<sup>19</sup>

### Eaton Board, August 1956

During implementation of the match-merge process, ConAC commander, Lt General Charles B. Stone, appointed Maj General Robert Eaton, Tenth Air Force commander, to conduct a study of the individual training program. The board included selected officials from HQ ConAC and its numbered air forces, a few ARC commanders, and several senior reservists. In addition to making significant recommendations for the development of noncommissioned officer management and leadership courses, the board unsuccessfully tried to defend the old theory of maintaining a large pool of reservists. The board appealed to the Air Staff to strengthen the general training program, asserting that

the Air Force had a legal obligation to train reservists in the Standby Reserve, as well as the Ready Reserve, despite the fact that they were not included in the mobilization requirements. This assertion was based on the Eaton Board's interpretation of the Armed Forces Act of 1952 that Congress intended that all reservists be in an active status unless on the inactive status list or assigned to the retired reserve.

Maj General Maurice R. Nelson, ConAC vice commander, carried the Eaton Board's appeal to the Air Staff in November 1956. General Nelson pointed out that the Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Act of 1948 offered paid retirement to reservists who reached age 60 with 20 years of satisfactory service who had participated on active or inactive duty. Since thousands of reservists then in the Standby Reserve were participating in training with the promised goals of promotion and retirement, General Nelson argued that the Air Force was obligated to continue the general training program. Some members of the Air Staff were sympathetic to the problem, but the new policy regarding mobilization requirements, along with a developing budget crisis, forced HQ USAF to reject the Eaton Board's conjectures.

### **Report of the Reserve Forces Review Group, 1959**

In a June 1959 memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Malcolm A. MacIntyre, made reference to the divided opinions within the Air Force about whether the existence of certain individual reserve programs could be justified. He expressed the opinion that positive requirements of these programs in support of active Air Force missions were not clear and that the process of relating actual requirements to capabilities was vague and sketchy. Consequently, he called for a complete and searching review of the entire individual reserve program structure, organization, and operation.<sup>20</sup> The Department of the Air Force gave this review tasking (among others) to the Reserve Forces Review Group under the chairmanship of General Sory Smith, commander, Fourth Air Force. Later known as the Smith

Committee, this 14-member review group included two Air Force reservists, two Air National Guardsmen, three Air Staff representatives and one representative each from ConAC, ADC, AMC, MATS, SAC and TAC. The group met at HQ USAF from 19 October 1959 through 10 November 1959, and produced the report, "The Air Reserve Forces... New Roles in a New Era." First of all, the group expressed the opinion that a definite military requirement existed for individual augmentation of most active force units immediately after mobilization for war or national emergency, but limited that necessity only to Part I reservists, i.e., those members assigned to major commands according to war plan requirements and trained by those MAJCOMs. However, they added that these individual reservists could only prove of value if they lived near the active force unit that they would augment, and if they received quality on-the-job proficiency training by that gaining unit.

According to the group, the individual program was plagued with questionable assignments, unfamiliarity with the parent unit, unrealistic training, and uneven distribution of skills within the reserve centers. Except for Part I individual reservists, all others should be phased out or formed into units with a broad mission of survival and recovery. These proposed new units would provide assistance to Air Force bases for facilities damaged in a nuclear attack; they would assist civil authorities in ensuring order, survival or restoration of key facilities; or would be responsible for emergency operations of military or civilian airports. In addition, membership in a unit would provide reservists with an important sense of belonging.

The most significant recommendation of the committee was the disintegration of ConAC, its numbered Air Forces and its immediate supporting structure, based on the assumption that a separate major command solely for Reserve Force administration was expensive in terms of both manpower and money. Part I reservists should be turned over in toto to their gaining commands, and the remainder should be administered by ARRC in Denver. And finally, the committee recommended the termination of all ARC facilities and programs.<sup>21</sup>



Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer developed the individual mobilization augmentee concept in 1947.



Lt Gen Leon W. Johnson, ConAC Commander, spoke at opening of Air Reserve Records Center (ARRC) in 1954.



Air Reserve Records Center, Detachment 1, ConAC, was established to accomplish centralization of reserve master files in 1954.



Col Carroll S. Geddes (Chief of Activities Group, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF, later commander of ARPC) assisted in implementation of Match-Merge Policy in 1956.





Dr. Theodore C. Marrs, AF Deputy for Reserve Affairs, called for review of IMA programs in 1968.



Maj Gen Tom E. Marchbanks, Jr., Chief of Air Force Reserve, organized review group in 1968.



Brig Gen Gerald A. Hart, Asst Deputy to Chief of Air Force Reserve, Chairman of "Hart Group," which examined IMA program organizational structure 1968-69.



Col Benjamin S. Catlin, III, ARPC Commander, member of "Hart Group," 1968-1969.



Col Mack E. Schwing (ARPC/JA) prepared study on single manager concept for management of legal IMAs in 1972.



Maj Gen James S. Cheney, Judge Advocate General, approved single manager concept for IMA legal program in 1972.



Maj Gen William Lyon, Chief of Air Force Reserve, initiated Mobilization Augmentee Revitalization Program (MARP) in 1975.



Col Thomas E. Walsh was appointed Special Assistant to Chief of Air Force Reserve for IMA Program in August 1975.



Maj Gen Richard Bodycombe, Chief of Air Force Reserve during AFMAG review of Air Force Reserve in 1982.



Maj Gen Sloan R. Gill, Chief of Air Force Reserve, established "Blue Ribbon Committee" in 1983 to examine IMA program management.



Col Joseph C. Ramsey, Jr., ARPC Commander, was Chairman of the IMA Task Force in 1987.



Maj Gen William Copeland, MA to Chief of Air Force Reserve, and Maj Gen Roger P. Scheer, Chief of Air Force Reserve (center left), were briefed by ARPC staff members regarding IMA Task Force initiatives in 1987.


## Part Three: USAFR Recovery and Base Support Groups (1960-1965)

Many of the Smith Committee's recommendations were reflected in the Air Force's new Plan for Revised Management of the Air Reserve Forces, which the Secretary of the Air Force adopted on 2 February 1960. He directed its complete integration by 1 January 1961.<sup>22</sup> ConAC remained but lost all of its numbered air forces, effective 1 September 1960, which were replaced by a system of six Air Force Reserve Regions (effective 1 July 1960) composed of newly created units with post-attack recovery or base support missions, to which Parts II and III individual reservists were assigned. (Individual reserve manpower strengths during this transition can be seen in Table Two.) The 16 Air Reserve Training Wings

became Air Force Reserve Sectors and the former ARCs remained under the jurisdiction of sectors to provide administrative support to the individual training programs and non-flying reserve units.


ConAC also suffered a manpower reduction at its headquarters. In terms of ConAC's relationship to the organized reserve units, it remained responsible for administration, logistic and budgeting support; however, MAJCOMs absorbed ConAC's responsibility for supervision of training and inspection of units. ConAC's responsibilities extended only to those individual reservists not specifically assigned to MAJCOMs.

### AIR FORCE RESERVE Management System (New)



\* Gaining Commands are responsible for Reserve units' training, supervision and inspection during peacetime; and command and control when mobilized.

### Continental Air Command Organizational Structure



**TABLE TWO:  
Ready Reserve Manpower Strengths**

as of 31 July 1960<sup>23</sup>

Total	Authorized		Assigned		Total	
	Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted	Authorized	Assigned
Cat "A"	8,371	35,334	5,707	21,091	43,705	26,798
ANG	10,243	67,738	8,603	62,551	77,981	71,154
Part I	14,556	24,199	7,741	1,018	38,755	8,759
II	7,939	39,277	2,776	5,377	47,216	8,153
III	16,958	61,242	10,905	8,284	78,200	19,189
<u>Sel Asg*</u>			<u>4,661</u>	<u>63,044</u>		<u>67,705</u>
SUBTOTAL	58,067	227,790	40,393	161,365	285,857	201,758
IRS**			9,409	66,428	-----	75,837
<u>Other (Crit Skill, AFA Preps)</u>			<u>121</u>	<u>2,269</u>	-----	<u>2,390</u>
TOTAL READY			49,923	230,062	285,857	279,985

\* selective assignee

\*\* Ineligible Reserve Section

### Air Force Reserve Recovery and Base Support Groups Established

The Recovery Program (which was to last only five years) included two new types of category A units, Reserve Base Support Group units and Reserve Recovery Group units, designed to train individual reservists. The Reserve Base Support Group units were located at active Regular Air Force bases with personnel assigned from Parts I, II, and III individual reservists. These reservists generally were within one day's travel time by surface transportation to the base concerned. The mission of these units was to provide the base with augmentation support during war or national emergency. ConAC was responsible for recruiting, training and administering these personnel, but these groups were under jurisdiction of the parent command of the base during war time, i.e., assigned to a MAJCOM. Training was done on the active base concerned.

The second type of unit, the Reserve Recovery Group units, made up of Parts II and III individual reservists, were assigned to ConAC. Functions assigned to the recovery units included aeromedical evacuation, bomb damage repair and rescue, medical services, security services, operation of recovery and dispersal airfields, and mobile ground communications.<sup>24</sup>

(Conversion of individual training to unit training first occurred as a test from 1 September 1960 through 30 June 1961, when six ARCs were converted to the new type units, one in each of the six regional areas.) On 1 July 1961, all Part II mobilization spaces were abolished.

ARRC, which earlier had been given the responsibility for assignment and reassignment of all individual reservists in Part II and III positions, began the process of assigning the remaining reservists to the approximately 300 new recovery groups. However, personnel who occupied Part II spaces were retained in their Part II assignments until 14 August 1961.<sup>25</sup>

ConAC was responsible for training reservists within the recovery groups and those still assigned to Part III mobilization spaces. Reservists in the recovery groups trained to provide a recovery and reconstitution team during a nuclear disaster. Part III reservists were trained in the Reserve Element Training Program, which included a few classroom offerings, such as a staff development course (all that ConAC could produce, considering budgetary limitations, a shortage of training equipment and lack of support).

Almost immediately, the recovery program for training individual reservists came under criticism. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatrick, demanded additional justification of the program, and the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense protested that the program did not represent a valid military requirement and that its concept had not been adequately coordinated with other Air Force and government agencies. At the request of Congress, the General Accounting Office reviewed the program in 1963. The resultant report, submitted in February 1964, criticized the Air Force for establishing reserve recovery squadrons at 200 airports nationwide without ascertaining the

needs of MAJCOMs, which the units were intended to serve. The Comptroller General charged that more than half of the reserve recovery squadrons would be of little value to the Air Force in an emergency. He therefore recommended that the Secretary of Defense immediately inactivate those recovery units for which there was no foreseeable need and inactivate other units as indicated upon completion of a review by the Air Force.<sup>26</sup>

During this same timeframe, the Air Force evaluated the recovery program in an effort to develop unit missions, training standards, facilities requirements and equipment policies. After examination, the Air Force also agreed that at least 131 units were formed unnecessarily, considering Air Force recovery requirements. Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert reluctantly agreed that defining a valid wartime mission for any of the units was questionable. ConAC deactivated all units by 25 March 1965.<sup>27</sup>

### Mobilization of Reserve Forces for Berlin Crisis

In the midst of this evaluation of the recovery program, several hundred individual reservists had to be called to active duty for the Berlin Crisis in late 1961. Problems had been developing between the United States and the Soviet Union over Berlin for several years. After World War II, Germany was divided into two zones of occupation: the Eastern zone controlled by the Soviets and the Western zone controlled by the remaining three allies – Britain, France and the United States. Berlin, the capital of Germany, was 110 miles deep within the Eastern zone and was divided into four zones each administered by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and the United States. (In 1948, the three Western allies consolidated their three zones into one.) The Soviets were never satisfied with the division of Berlin or the presence of the other three allies and made several attempts to force them out.

The situation continued to smolder until June 1961 when Premier Nikita Krushchev informed President John F. Kennedy that he intended to sign a unilateral treaty with East Germany, which would recognize no American rights in Berlin. Krushchev intimated that if the United States violated the treaty or if American troops crossed East German borders, the USSR would stop them with force.

On 25 July 1961, President Kennedy addressed the nation and apprised the American people of the serious developments in Berlin and announced that he would

meet this threat to peace by asking Congress for authority to increase military strength authorizations, mobilize necessary Reserve forces, and implement the draft. On 1 August, Congress responded positively by passing Public Law 87-117, which authorized the President to order involuntarily any Reserve unit and any members not assigned to a unit to active duty for not more than twelve months.<sup>28</sup>

In the Air Force, two troop carrier wings (the 435th and the 442nd) were mobilized, and beginning in October 1961, ARRC mobilized 2,810 filler personnel for those units. The fillers included 316 Part I individual mobilization assignees, 364 individual reservists (Part II) who had already been assigned to recovery groups, and 153 Part III individual reservists.<sup>29</sup>

### Reserve Recovery Units in the Cuban Missile Crisis

One year later, the discovery of the construction of missile sites in Cuba led to the recall of 238 Air Force Reserve units (14,064 reservists) on 28 October 1962.

During this crisis, 249 individual reservists from 38 recovery units expended 6,313 special tour man-days from Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) funds, in support of active Air Force units. The 8378th Air Force Reserve Recovery Group in Port Columbus, Ohio, rendered assistance to SAC military aircraft from 22 October until 28 November. Beginning on 24 October, the 8441st AFRRG in Miami, Florida, supported Air Force, Army, and Navy forces with communications, transportation, operations, finance, air police, refueling, security, billeting, and civil engineering. Beginning on 26 October, recovery groups in Maine and Massachusetts rendered valuable assistance to Loring AFB, Maine, Westover AFB, Massachusetts, and Pease AFB, New Hampshire, with services in armament, transportation, fire protection, refueling, supply, maintenance, finance, and medical. In Grand Island, Nebraska, recovery group members provided turnaround support for F-102 aircraft, which included refueling, liquid oxygen servicing, replacing draft chutes, servicing compressed air, billeting support personnel, providing office space and security, and coordinating with local community offices.<sup>30</sup>

Since no filler action was required by ARRC during the Cuban Missile Crisis, no Part I or Part III mobilization assignees were recalled to active duty as they were during the Berlin crisis one year earlier.

In spite of the recovery groups' participation in the two mobilizations, the Air Force went ahead with its plans to end the recovery program.

## Part Four: Swing Towards Centralization of IMA Management

For nearly three years after the demise of the Recovery Group program (1965), the management of the IMA program was left in the hands of MAJCOMs, each one handling its program in its own unique way. The management of the other individual programs was fragmented among MAJCOMs, Air Reserve Personnel Center (until 1965, ARRC), and the Regions. The Air Staff paid little attention to administering the mobilization augmentee program while it coped with the demands imposed by the Air Force's involvement in Southeast Asia.<sup>31</sup>

The consequences of fragmentary management responsibilities were foreseeable. Since there was no central point for assignments, promotion, recruitment, training proficiency, etc., the individual reserve programs slowly diminished in both stature and numbers.

Effective 1 January 1968, Public Law 90-168, the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, authorized the establishment of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the Office of Air Force Reserve.<sup>32</sup> In addition, by order of the Secretary of the Air Force, the ConAC was reorganized and renamed Headquarters Air Force Reserve (AFRES), effective 1 August 1968, and the ARPC became a separate operating agency with the procedural functions and responsibilities of a MAJCOM.<sup>33</sup>

The reorganization of the reserve structure reflected the concern of Congress and the Air Force for maintenance of a reserve force with increased autonomy and management responsibility. In compliance with the new law, the Air Force determined that the new AFRES command at Robins AFB and ARPC at Lowry AFB would be manned to the extent feasible by 60 percent regular and 40 percent reserve 265 (statutory tour) officers.<sup>34</sup> By this time, individual reservists once called mobilization assignees were no longer referred to as Part I, II, and III reservists. They were referred to as mobilization augmentees and reinforcement designees. Per Air Force Manual 35-3 (20 July 1965), Air Reserve Forces Personnel Administration, individual reservists were defined as follows:<sup>35</sup>

### (a) Augmentation

1. Part I, major air command war augmentation authorization for individuals; personnel assigned to and trained by the command.

2. Units not organized to serve as units; category A units not organized to serve as units in the event of mobilization (e.g., navigator training squadrons).

### (b) Reinforcement

1. Part II, general war requirement for individuals; individual reinforcement personnel requirements of the Air Force; these persons were assigned to ConAC.

2. Ready Reinforcement Personnel Section (RRPS); personnel required for attritional replacements and selected active force skill shortages; assigned to ConAC; a pool resource to provide the Air Force with additional manning capability.

### Marrs Study, October 1968

Shortly following the subsequent changes in the administrative structure of the Air Force reserve programs, Theodore C. Marrs, the Air Force Deputy for Reserve Affairs, directed Maj General Tom E. Marchbanks, Jr., Chief of Air Force Reserve, to examine possible new organizational methods for improving the management of individual manpower resources. The team chosen to carry out this task was headed by Brig General Gerald A. Hart, Assistant Deputy to the Chief of Air Force Reserve. Additional team members were Lt Colonel Ole P. Flass, also from Office of the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Colonel Benjamin S. Catlin, III, ARPC Commander, and USC 265 officers from each major command. Nearly one year later, in September 1969, they presented their recommendations to Marrs.<sup>36</sup>

The "Hart Group" proposed that ARPC assume a more instrumental role in reserve management structure.<sup>37</sup> It recommended that AFRES retain management of the flying units, but the management responsibility for all individual training programs be centralized at ARPC. This action would consolidate at one location in the Reserve management structure, the responsibility for the management of the individual program.

According to the study group, this arrangement of programs took advantage of the resources of the Office of Air Force Reserve (AFTOR, later known as AF/RE) to develop policy and provide guidance in coordination with Air Staff in both the unit and individual programs. It brought the capabilities of AFRES and ARPC into closer contact with the reserve resource they were most qualified to manage. They considered that this realignment would increase the opportunity for utilization of the reserve manpower pool in support of mobilization requirements.

The "Hart Group" believed that the simplicity of having a specified, single location that every reservist, as well as those interested in the reserve program, could turn to for assignment, information or service, made for increased efficiency. They felt that the structure, as it was, resulted in inadequate emphasis on recruiting and failure to utilize prior service personnel in the reserve.

With reference to the MAJCOMs, the group recommended that MAJCOMs continue to establish, review and validate their individual mobilization augmentation requirements and advise ARPC of existing vacant

cies and changes in requirements. From lists of qualified personnel provided them by ARPC, the MAJCOMs would interview and recruit to man the requirement. They would establish training requirements and standards and conduct proficiency training for assigned IMAs. They would evaluate the proficiency of the participants and render appropriate reports.

Two further important recommendations concerning the MAJCOMs' administrative structure followed:

a) Statutory tour (10 USC, Section 265) officers at MAJCOMs should work in close harmony with the Reserve Affairs sections to ensure that IMA program objectives were achieved and that required actions were accomplished in a timely manner; and

b) MAJCOMs should utilize their reserve general officers assigned as Mobilization Assistants in the internal operation of their IMA program.

Marrs approved the proposal on 20 October 1969. Responsibilities for the Office of the Chief of Air Force Reserve, ARPC, AFRES, and MAJCOMs were outlined in the USAF Individual Reserve Resource Management Plan I-70, published in May 1970.

According to that plan, the Individual Reserve Management Division (AFTORT) of the Office of the Chief of Air Force Reserve, created on 19 January 1970, was specifically responsible for:

1. Supporting the management and administration policies of the Chief of Air Force Reserve on matters applicable to Individual Reserve resources;

2. Assisting the Chief in accomplishing that portion of Section 262, 10 USC, PL 90-168, which established a requirement for the reserve force to provide trained and qualified individuals for active duty when and as required;

3. Coordinating with other Air Staff agencies in formulating plans and developing procedures for administering and utilizing reservists in support of Air Force requirements; and

4. Providing guidance to ARPC and AFRES in the form of tasks, direction, advice and counsel applicable to Individual Reserve resources.

According to the I-70 Plan, the MAJCOMs were to:

1. Continue to establish, review and validate their individual mobilization augmentation requirements. They were to advise ARPC of existing vacancies and changes in requirements, and from the lists of qualified personnel provided them by ARPC, interview and recruit to fill the requirement. They were to

establish training requirements and standards and conduct proficiency training for assigned IMAs. They were to evaluate the proficiency of participants and render appropriate reports.

2. Coordinate with the Assistant for General Officer Matters on the use of reserve general officers in the operation of major command programs. Train the general officers to assume their augmentation positions. Insure that controls and procedures existed to measure the effectiveness of general officer training programs.

3. Involve 265 officers in management responsibilities of IMA program. The 265 officers assigned to MAJCOMs and/or their subordinate organizations would ensure the IMA program at their level of assignment received maximum exposure and attention and maintain close liaison with AF/RE, ARPC and AFRES to ensure that annual inactive duty training and active duty objectives met wartime training requirements.

Headquarters Air Force Reserve was to remain responsible for management, supervision, and training of all unit reserve personnel resources, as well as administer and provide inactive duty training for IMAs assigned or attached to AFRES.

**TABLE THREE:  
MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE MANNING  
BY MAJCOM (JUNE 1971)**

Major Command	Authorized		Assigned	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
SAC	73	0	37	0
AAC	33	59	16	8
USAFSO	3	0	2	0
USAFA	1	0	0	0
USAFSS	162	103	38	2
AFE	280	4,399	33	56
AFRES	485	12	431	8
MAC	427	443	309	55
ADC	643	3,091	361	269
AFLC	568	483	281	212
PACAF	1,074	4,060	172	46
TAC	702	3,933	441	367
HQ COMD USAF	2,472	1,571	1,494	245
AFSC	1,138	2,210	631	182
AFCS	173	513	107	36
ATC	81	5	58	0
AU	24	2	15	1
DSC	20	6	16	4
ARPC	39	2	35	2
AFAFC	<u>29</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>0</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,427</b>	<b>20,892</b>	<b>4,507</b>	<b>1,493</b>



ARPC was responsible for individual Reserve resources, which included:

1. Working in concert with MAJCOMs in recruitment of qualified reserve personnel to meet mobilization program requirements and providing current lists of personnel residing in the area of the requirement with necessary skills;

2. Continuing the management and administration of Reinforcement Reserve Designees identified as RRPS, Air Force Academy Prep School Selectees, NARS, and ORS; and retired personnel in ISLRS and the USAF Retired list;

3. Providing administrative and logistical support, recruiting assistance, coordination on annual tours and training for such professional individual reservists assigned to the Judge Advocate General Area Representative program (JAGAR), the Chaplain Area Representative Program (CHAPAR), Information Squadrons and Flights, the Air Force Academy Liaison Officer program (AFALO), AFROTC Liaison program, and the Civil Air Patrol Liaison Officer program (CAPLO). These programs were transferred from AFRES to ARPC, effective 1 December 1971.<sup>38</sup>

The magnitude of these added responsibilities for ARPC called for the establishment of one new directorate to administer all individual reserve programs. The Directorate of Individual Reserve Programs was established and became operational on 1 July 1970.<sup>39</sup>

After coordinating efforts in organization and management responsibilities with AFTOR and AFRES, the new directorate at ARPC was generally responsible for formulating plans and policies for administering education and training programs for individual reservists, and, in some cases, administering and/or assisting in administering these programs.

The Directorate of Individual Reserve Programs (ARPC/RT) was originally organized with three divisions: Programs, Field Operations, and Support. According to the ARPC Organization-Function Chart Book dated 1 July 1970, the mission of the directorate was to administer the AF Individual Reserve Program. Specifically, the directorate formulated operating policies and programs; developed plans and policies for education and training and directed the preparation and review of training materials; coordinated training requirements with HQ USAF, MAJCOMs, and Air University; assisted in the development of special formal training and correspondence courses; directed maintenance of unit personnel actions for participating reservists; and directed coordination activities between command and field elements of the program.

The Programs Division was organized to develop and administer procedures for school tours, man-day accounting, active duty training tours, course development, and report requirements for various programs. This division allocated training spaces for approved

courses; established and administered procedures for selecting members to attend school tours; and coordinated development of training courses with AU and ATC to meet special reserve training requirements.

The Field Operations Division provided recruiting assistance to MAJCOMs for IMAs. This division was to respond to reservist inquiries in matters pertaining to individual reserve programs and coordinate the flow of information between MAJCOMs and participants to promote programs.

The Reinforcement Designee Division of ARPC's Consolidated Reserve Personnel Office (CRPO) was transferred to the new directorate to become the Support Division. This division provided budget, logistical and personnel administrative support to the various individual reserve programs.



### Manpower Strengths in IMA Program Decline

The centralized leadership role the Chief of Air Force Reserve and ARPC were to offer the IMA program via the Marris reorganization did not seem to close the gap between authorized and assigned manpower strengths. By the end of 1970, the total mobilization augmentee assigned strengths had already dropped another 20 percent to 6,631 (5,141 officer; 1,490 enlisted). By June 1971, assigned manpower strengths had dropped another ten percent to 6,000. Authorized strengths were set at 29,319 (8,427 officer; 20,892 enlisted). (See Table Three for a breakdown of manning strengths, authorized and assigned, by major command.)<sup>40</sup>

AFTORT, which was to provide policy guidance to ARPC regarding the individual reserve programs, never attained its proposed strength. In late 1971, it was eliminated as a division, and one officer in the Personnel Division, Office of Air Force Reserve, (now HQ USAF/REP) was given the additional duty of acting as a point of contact for ARPC regarding individual program matters.<sup>41</sup>

ARPC voiced concern over the manning problem in January 1972 as well as ARPC's inability to resolve it. Even though the wording in the original Marris study and later guidance provided by the Chief of Air Force Reserve stated that ARPC was the manager of the "entire Individual Program" and had the "responsibility for the

management of the Air Force Reserve with the exception of Category A units...," in reality, ARPC's involvement with the IMA portion was only one of providing recruitment support to MAJCOMs when notified. Officially, ARPC was given authority only to assist MAJCOMs by referring to them potential participants. Therefore, in terms of management of the IMA program, centralization of management functions at ARPC did not occur; the MAJCOMs continued to administer their own IMA programs. They were responsible for assigning personnel to authorized positions included in their MAJCOM War Augmentation Authorization for Individuals, and IMA immediate supervisors evaluated training requirements and designated IMAs to appropriate training categories.

### **Single Manager Programs Developed**

One major effort to resolve management problems was the establishment of single manager programs at ARPC. At a January 1972 IMA work conference at HQ USAF/RE, all participants agreed to pursue a single manager management structure for the management of IMAs in certain professional fields.

At this time, all professional IMA requirements were established and controlled by the MAJCOMs, and each individual was assigned by the MAJCOM to an active duty location for training, dependent upon which base was closest to the IMA or where the IMA desired to train. Assignments were made based on the needs of the IMA without regard to the mobilization needs of that particular organization.

In a study carried out by the Office of the Judge Advocate General and the Staff Judge Advocate at ARPC (Colonel Mack E. Schwing) regarding legal mobilization augmentees, several weaknesses in the system were pointed out. Even though MAJCOMs carried out assignment and training functions, the Judge Advocate General was responsible for world-wide assignment in time of national emergency. Yet carrying out that function with no single point of control seemed difficult at best. The study also pointed out that there was no single office with the facilities to monitor training and control the assignment of each individual reservist.

Other problems were cited. With no central recruiting program, valuable assets were being lost. For instance, one major command could have a recently promoted lieutenant colonel who actively and regularly produced outstanding work, yet that MAJCOM did not have a vacant position for a lieutenant colonel to occupy. However, there could be another major command where a lower grade reserve officer, possibly one of less talent, would be serving in a higher grade position, i.e., a major in a lieutenant colonel position. Unless one command would voluntarily give up the higher grade position (an unlikely occurrence), the recently promoted officer would be forced into the Non-Affiliated Reserve Section (NARS).

Under this management structure, there was no centralized authority available to which the IMA could turn for guidance.<sup>42</sup>

Based on the study's recommendation, Maj General James S. Cheney, the Judge Advocate General, approved the single manager concept and placed field administration of the legal program with the Staff Judge Advocate of ARPC, effective 1 July 1972.

The benefits, according to those who conceived the JAG single manager program concept, were that ARPC/JA provided the Judge Advocate General with a single management point, which would measurably enhance the manageability of the program and would enhance the training of each IMA, consequently providing each MAJCOM with a more useful reservist. It would ensure that only the best qualified reserve JAGs would be placed in higher grade positions and be eligible for promotions. IMAs would be selected to fill these positions by a board of Judge Advocates upon recommendation by MAJCOM staff judge advocates. Through this channel, each MAJCOM would have the opportunity to promote its best qualified IMAs. This concept would greatly simplify transfer of reservists from one training organization to another, simply by issuing a new training attachment order. It would provide better personnel service to individual reservists as they would have a single point of contact, should a problem arise.<sup>43</sup> (See Table Four for JAG IMA Manning Statistics, 1974-1990.)

The Air Force Chief of Chaplains, Maj General (Chaplain) Roy M. Terry, expressed the same opinion about the problems of managing the chaplain IMA program in 1972. He instituted a single manager program with ARPC's Office of the Command Chaplain (ARPC/HC) as that single manager, effective 1 August 1972. Specifically, he stated that the result of management of chaplain IMAs being exercised by the various major commands was the absence of a central management authority. There was no standardized training or philosophy of utilization. Frequently, a reservist would be assigned to one base and attached to another for training at opposite ends of the country. There was little career progression, and there was no central point for all personnel, pay, or assignment actions. Under the single manager concept, the Chief of Chaplains, responsible for broad policy and programming guidance, managed the program through the Command Chaplain at ARPC, who had final authority on all assignment and personnel actions. Again, training and rating of each chaplain reservist were the responsibilities of the senior installation chaplain of the organization of attachment but would be monitored closely by ARPC/HC.<sup>44</sup> (See Table Four for Chaplain IMA Manning Statistics, 1974-1990.)

The process to adopt a single manager concept for medical IMAs soon followed. On 17 to 24 September 1972, the USAFR Medical Management Conference was held in Washington specifically to discuss plans for

single management of medical mobilization augmentee reservists. The resulting study provided the same conclusion as the legal and chaplain studies: the problems with the medical management system were no central management authority, low Manning levels because of no centralized recruiting program, no planned career progression, and finally, no monitoring of personnel actions (assignments, pay, etc.). On 6 June 1973, Lt General Louis L. Wilson, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, notified all MAJCOMs that effective 1 July 1973, the Office of the Surgeon at ARPC received official status as single manager of the medical mobilization augmentee program.<sup>45</sup> (See Table Four for Medical IMA Manning Statistics, 1974-1990.)

Although not a single managed program, ARPC was tasked with implementation of the Civil Defense Mobilization Designee Program (CDMOBDES) on 1 July 1972. This program had an allocation of 2,932 positions for reserve officers and airmen who could be assigned to one of eight Defense Civil Preparedness (DCPA) regions. The 9006 ARS was created for the administration and assignment of reservists to the DCPA program. (On 20 July 1979, the functions of the DCPA were transferred to the Federal Emer-

**TABLE FOUR: ARPC SINGLE MANAGER  
IMA MANNING STATISTICS (1974-1990)**

Year	Single Manager	OFFICER			ENLISTED			
		Auth	Assnd	Funded	Auth	Assnd	Funded	
1974	JAG	762	610		105	18		
1975		771	719		105	10		
1976		771	732		105	9		
1977		771	699		105	11		
1978		771	724		105	42		
1979		771	720		105	63		
(1980-1982 statistics not available)								
1983			772	736		210	186	
1984			772	731		210	180	
1985			772	706		210	174	
1986		772	709		210	149		
1987		772	715		210	153		
1988		772	723	618	210	158	158	
1989		806	690	618	252	143	158	
1990		806	668	618	252	138	158	
1974	CHAP	150	150		84	28		
1975		150	145		84	22		
1976		150	150		84	26		
1977		150	142		84	22		
1978		150	129		84	26		
1979		150	134		84	28		
(1980-1982 statistics not available)								
1983			450	323		99	57	
1984			450	364		99	83	
1985			450	362		99	85	
1986		450	359		99	90		
1987		450	370		99	91		
1988		450	409	348	99	90	90	
1989		450	378	388	99	85	90	
1990		449	403	388	99	100	90	
1974	MED	506	688		722	263		
1975		706	413		384	197		
1976		706	463		384	211		
1977		706	504		384	199		
1978		706	558		384	225		
1979		890	620		384	244		
(1980-1982 statistics not available)								
1983			1341	981		529	357	
1984			1341	1109		529	451	
1985			1341	1135		529	440	
1986		1556	1227		749	442		
1987		1555	1228		749	461		
1988		1554	1189	1132	749	506	475	
1989		1402	1158	1222	949	422	435	
1990		1356	1275	1322	949	486	535	

gency Management Agency (FEMA).<sup>46</sup>

The Mobilization Augmentee Reserve Supplement Officer Program, MA(RSO), became a single managed program in July 1973 but was terminated in 1980. In September 1972, HQ AFMPC defined a need to replace active duty pilots and navigators who filled nonrated jobs during peacetime with nonrated individual reservists. These nonrated reserve officers would serve as understudies of rated officers who would be returned to flying duty in the event of war or a national emergency. On 19 July 1973, the 9020th Air Reserve Squadron was activated at ARPC and composed of reservists participating in the MA(RSO) program. A project officer was temporarily appointed within ARPC's Directorate of Plans to oversee the implementation of the MA(RSO) program. In July 1974, the Reserve Supplement Officer Training Division (RTI) within the Directorate of Individual Reserve Programs was established and was responsible for the overall management of the program. Recruiting, vacancy identification, and manning became the responsibility of the Directorate of Personnel Resources.<sup>47</sup>

The number of MA(RSO)s increased from an early authorization of 508 positions to a high of 1,247 in 1976. The program authorizations were always dependent upon the number of excess rated officers (the Rated Supplement) in the active force. When the program began, there were 6,500 rated officers assigned to non-rated, active force positions. During the late seventies, however, the Air Force experienced an exodus of rated officers; consequently, the number of MA(RSO)s authorizations declined as well. By 1 February 1980, the rated supplement stood at 3,137 and was programmed to decline to 2,039 by year-end. Another factor contributing to the eventual demise of the MA(RSO) program was the decision in 1980 by HQ USAF/MPMX that MA(RSO)s should be authorized only for positions that were documented in the Wartime Planning Exercise as validated wartime shortfalls. Of the 981 authorizations at that time, only 146 were validated wartime shortfalls. In March 1980, ARPC was notified to transfer the MA(RSO) validated wartime positions to regular MA authorizations and drop the remaining 872 positions from the rolls by 1 October 1980.<sup>48</sup>

In January 1974, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ USAF, directed that a centrally managed Air Force intelligence IMA program be established. The Directorate of Intelligence Reserve Forces (AFIS/RE) at the Air Force Intelligence Service<sup>49</sup>, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, was subsequently organized to provide functional management for the new program. The directorate's specific mission was to plan, coordinate, and monitor worldwide use of intelligence reservists, and ensure active force support.<sup>50</sup> This program did not include the intelligence resources of Electronic Security Command.

Prior to January 1974, the number of IMAs holding

intelligence positions was limited to 300 reservists. By July 1975, after a forceful recruiting effort and establishment of programs for training and management, this number climbed to 860 authorized positions (446 assigned), comprising the full spectrum of intelligence specialties. The number of manpower allocations to AFIS steadily increased over the next 12 years. (In December 1987, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs & Resources (HQ USAF/PR), directed all IMA program managers to code IMA authorizations as "funded" and "unfunded." At the same time, HQ USAF/REP informed all managers of congressionally mandated end strength ceilings. As a result of these two actions, AFIS' baseline authorized/assigned levels dropped slightly.<sup>51</sup>) See Table Five for AFIS IMA Manning Statistics, 1974-1990.

### Mobilization Augmentee Revitalization Program (MARP), 1975

Even with the formation of the single managed programs, the gap between authorized and assigned IMA personnel strengths was still unacceptable to Air Force planners. In July 1974 the Secretary of the Air Force, John L. McLucas, reflecting increased concern on the part of DoD and Congress, initiated a close examination of the discrepancy between strength and authorizations in the individual reserve program.<sup>52</sup> The following data reflect the disparity between authorized and assigned personnel as of 31 Mar 1975:

	Officer	Airmen	Total
Total Authorized	9,095	7,452	16,547
Total Assigned	5,773	1,308	7,081

If this disparity were eliminated, one of two possible courses of action seemed necessary—either acquiescence in funding cuts to bring monetary support in correspondence with actual program strength or revitalization of the IMA program, so that manning authorizations could be met. Recognizing the substantial contribution of the IMA program towards mobilization readiness, the Air Force selected the second option and initiated the MARP, signed by the Chief of Air Force Reserve, Maj General William Lyon, on 1 May 1975. The plan was presented to General David Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff, and on 12 June 1975, he added his approval of the plan, directing each MAJCOM commander to personally support this revitalization program to attain maximum benefits from this resource. He clearly emphasized his belief in the necessity of an IMA program.<sup>53</sup>

The Mobilization Augmentee (MA) Program, the only individual program in the Air Reserve Forces, consists of qualified prior service personnel in various career fields. The principal charter of the MA is to augment the active force during contingencies and in wartime. However, under the Total Force Policy

this mission has been expanded to include support of the active force peacetime mission requirements as an adjunct to training. The utilization of these individuals to augment personnel shortfalls or critical skills areas is paramount in view of the austere environment in which we operate.

It is important to note that General Jones advocated a policy of expanding the role of the IMA. Prior to this letter, the definition of an IMA was directly related to active force needs during war or general mobilization. He expressed the opinion in this letter that the MA resource could make a substantive contribution to meeting Air Force peacetime mission requirements as well. The MARP's definition of an IMA included this expanded function.

The MARP guidelines for improving the overall management structure of the IMA program were not original. Again, as the Marrs study indicated five years earlier, a staff element in the Office of the Chief of the Air Force Reserve (HQ USAF/RE, formerly AFTOR) to direct the program was necessary. General Lyon appointed Colonel Thomas E. Walsh, formerly assigned to ARPC, as Special Assistant to the Chief of Air Force Reserve for the IMA Program on 28 August 1975. HQ USAF/RE was responsible for overall direction as well as specifically to

- a) Act as Air Staff point of contact for matters dealing with the IMA program management and operations,
- b) Monitor the implementation and operation of MARP,

c) Provide policy guidance and interface with Air Staff, MAJCOMs, SOAs, and ARPC, and

d) Analyze and evaluate the functional areas to determine the possibility of expanding single manager programs similar to those programs already established at ARPC, which were considered successful management programs.

(Later, on 17 January 1977, General Lyon returned Colonel Walsh to ARPC to serve as its vice commander and relocated the Office of Special Assistant for MA Matters to ARPC, which, in turn, was designated the Mobilization Augmentee Management Office (RTW) within the Directorate of Individual Reserve Programs. On 1 March 1977, Major James M. Bates was assigned as Chief of the MA Management Office and was under the supervision of Colonel Walsh. The functions of this office were specifically to monitor the IMA program; recommend policy and provide interface with Air Staff, MAJCOMs/SOAs, and AFMPC; recommend IMA program concepts, reporting and quality control systems; monitor planning and programming of all IMA programs; and monitor recruiting and retention, utilization and training programs.)<sup>54</sup>

On the MAJCOM level, MARP called for the involvement of reserve general officers and statutory tour officers in monitoring the IMA program of their assigned commands (as did the Marrs directive five years earlier). Their involvement was to relieve the active force of time-consuming managerial and administrative tasks connected with IMA program activities. These activities

encompassed management, recruiting, retention, education and training, utilization and accomplishments, personnel quality control and information and incentive programs for IMAs. MARP envisioned a MAJCOM organizational entity consisting of the general officer or senior mobilization assistant, the reserve advisor (a 265 officer) and a senior NCO (IMA) selected from the MAJCOM MA resource. The team was responsible to the MAJCOM commander for the overall management of his IMA force.

ARPC's role, in view of resolving manning

**TABLE FIVE:  
AFIA IMA MANNING STATISTICS (1974-1990)**

Date	Officer	Authorized		Funded	Assigned		
		Airman	Total		Officer	Airman	Total
30 Jun 1974	322	222	544		269	68	337
31 Jul 1975	588	272	860		343	103	446
31 May 1976	588	272	860		447	193	640
25 May 1977	691	344	1,035		572	215	787
31 May 1978	691	344	1,035		637	217	854
31 May 1979	865	492	1,357		634	230	864
1980 (unknown)							
1981 (unknown)							
1982 (unknown)							
30 Jun 1983	1,014	761	1,775		831	300	1,131
1 Apr 1984	1,041	745	1,786		870	311	1,181
1 May 1985	1,042	736	1,778		846	333	1,179
1 Jun 1986	1,166	973	2,139		809	376	1,185
1 Jun 1987	1,166	973	2,139		836	413	1,249
1 Jun 1988	1,211	885	2,096	1,289	853	370	1,223
1 Jun 1989	1,210	877	2,087	1,270	839	364	1,203
1 Jun 1990	1,210	877	2,087	1,270	861	367	1,228

shortfalls, was to provide a maximum effort to fill vacancies in the IMA program. However, MARP indicated that improved manning was first the responsibility of the MAJCOMs, who must identify to ARPC actual and/or projected IMA vacancies. The Center was then responsible for systematizing these vacancy listings and passing them on to AFRES recruiters, who then referred personnel to ARPC for verification of matches and assignment. ARPC was also tasked with the responsibility of developing requirements for training standards, which were to be formalized by ATC and administered by the gaining commands. ARPC was also directed to establish contact with non-Air Force agencies to effect agreements necessary to assist these agencies in meeting their manning requirements.

The MARP plan indicated that improvements were needed in management, recruiting, retention, education and training, and utilization. Further, the study conjectured that severe reductions of active force manpower compounded these problems, i.e., MAJCOMs found it difficult to devote time to planning for effective utilization and management of their IMA resources.

The short-range objectives of MARP were to 1) fill programmed positions in the Selected Reserve with qualified personnel; 2) train to reach the highest level of readiness; 3) utilize IMAs to meet Air Force peacetime mission requirements as a by-product of training; and 4) manage the program more effectively. The long-range objective was to improve the management, manning and training in the IMA program.

Many MAJCOMs and SOAs developed excellent programs; for instance, in February 1976, AFLC created a statutory officer position to the commander (AFLC/CR) for the specific purpose of overseeing their IMA program. The Reserve Affairs Office, created to manage all reserve personnel functions for assigned IMAs, became a Chief of Staff Office (AFLC/CK) on 4 November 1984. The Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) of Air Force Systems Command initiated a unitized program of IMA reserve training in May 1973 very similar to the AFIS program. The ASD commander's mobilization augmentee, Brig General Byron K. Boettcher, and Rafael T. Mardrosian of ASD's Plans and Programs Office were the principal architects. By 1979, more than 360 IMAs were participating. Several important studies were conducted for the Division by IMAs—a review of energy conservation and management in the Air Force's industrial plans, a study of the effects on the propulsion industry of shortages of such critical materials as cobalt and titanium, and an assessment of the Air Force's tanker aircraft requirements through the year 2000. Possessing advanced degrees and technical and professional skills, IMAs at ASD have given the command a pool of talent in such fields as engineering, business management, science, and education. In September 1974, AFIS authorized increased numbers of clearances for sensitive in-

formation to IMAs. Linguists in the program were then able to participate in a study of the USSR civil defense systems and in the development and teaching of courses in science and technology at the Armed Forces Air Intelligence Training Center at Lowry AFB, Colorado. Its development and operations during its first year earned the program the Air Force Organizational Excellence Award.<sup>55</sup>

To meet its responsibilities in attempting to fill vacancies, ARPC developed the Mobilization Augmentee Requisition System (MARS), which was implemented on 1 November 1975. This system defined responsibilities for major commands, AFRES recruiters, and ARPC in identifying vacancies, recruiting personnel for the program, and assigning them to vacant positions. The system operated in the following manner: MAJCOMs/SOAs identified MA vacancies and submitted monthly requisition lists to the Career Development Division (DPRO) of ARPC's Directorate of Personnel Resources. ARPC/DPRO consolidated the lists and sent them to AFRES for distribution to recruiters. Upon identification of potential resources, recruiters submitted names to ARPC/DPRO, who in turn analyzed the resource and worked to fill the vacancy.<sup>56</sup>

During the first two months of operation of the new requisition system, 934 vacancies were reported by MAJCOMs to ARPC. By 31 December, ARPC/DPRO received 181 referrals from AFRES recruiters and filled 97 positions. Within the next three years, the gap between authorized and assigned strengths slowly narrowed. See Table Six for IMA manning strengths for 1975-1978.

### Proposal to Centralize Management of IMA Programs at ARPC

In the spring of 1977, while agreeing that some refinements and improvements had resulted since the inception of MARP, ARPC program managers felt that the IMA program was still lacking in responding to its charged responsibilities of more effectively augmenting the active force. From their point of view, with the exception of the single managed programs, IMA functions were directed by the respective MAJCOMs with discernible differences. Quality factors such as training, career development, active duty personnel acceptance, etc., showed wide disparities. Emphasis and support of the program were dependent upon the strength or weakness of command support and visibility. In other words, fragmented management of the IMA program precluded development of the optimum, trained and responsive resource necessary to support the active force requirements.<sup>57</sup>

Consequently, based on its review of the program after two years of involvement with the revitalization program, ARPC proposed a major conceptual/structural change to the entire MAJCOM/SOA mobilization augmentee program. This proposal called for central-

**TABLE SIX:  
IMA MANNING STRENGTHS (1975-1978)**

Date	Authorized			Assigned		
	Officer	Airman	Total	Officer	Airman	Total
31 Dec 1975	9,044	6,117	15,161	6,271	1,329	7,600
31 Dec 1976	9,156	5,888	15,044	6,537	1,745	8,282
31 Dec 1977	9,157	5,855	15,012	6,648	1,811	8,459
31 Dec 1978	9,123	6,269	15,392	7,003	2,032	9,035

ized management of all IMAs at ARPC through the application of the following actions:<sup>58</sup>

a. All MAJCOM/SOA IMAs were to be attached to ARPC for administrative purposes and command control.

b. IMAs would be further attached for training (or Proficiency Refresher Duty) to active duty bases, Air Force Reserve units, or even Air National Guard units. This arrangement would provide numerous additional geographical locations for potential duty performance, thereby offering added convenience to IMAs in completion of active participation requirements.

c. The "unit vacancy" promotion system was to be revitalized, with those recognized as "outstanding" receiving promotion consideration against all available vacant positions, as opposed to just those positions in the MAJCOM of assignment.

d. An Air Reserve Management Officer (ARMO) was to be appointed at each base having IMAs attached. One IMA officer position was to be established for the purpose of assisting the ARMO, who would be authorized direct coordination with the installation commander. (This action was projected to offset the lack of base/unit local overall management and operation of the IMA program.)

The Center presented its proposal to General Lyon (HQ USAF/RE) in a briefing 28 November 1977. General Lyon concurred with the proposal and authorized ARPC to conduct a one-year test of the centralized management program. Since several MAJCOMs (including AFLC, ATC, TAC, MAC, and AFCS), when approached with the new concept, verbally indicated to General Lyon that they were interested in the consolidated management concept, he decided the test would be carried out at those five sites. A workshop was scheduled at ARPC in February 1978 to discuss the concept and the application of the one-year test.<sup>59</sup>

By the time the workshop took place, MAJCOMs had second doubts about the new concept, in spite of its endorsement by General Lyon. With representatives from 20 MAJCOM/SOAs in attendance, including 10 MA general officers, workshop attendees successfully aborted plans to implement the one-year test.

Only one action in the proposed plan was implemented. In the months that followed, some MAJCOMs designated active duty officers or civilian employees to

serve as ARMOs and allocate additional IMA positions for the express purpose of assisting the local ARMOs.<sup>60</sup>

### **Functional Management Inspection of the IMA Program, 1978-79**

The USAF Inspector General, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, at the request of General Lyon, conducted a functional management inspection (FMI) of the aug-

mentee program from 5 September 1978 to 13 August 1979. Reporting in November 1979, the Inspector General criticized the Chief of Air Force Reserve for failing to delegate authority for the program's management. He recommended that management of the program be transferred from the active force (MAJCOMs) to ARPC and that authorizations for augmentees be centrally identified at the Air Staff level rather than the user's level.<sup>61</sup>

He also stated that some IMA authorizations were not founded on validated wartime requirements, some IMAs were unqualified in their mobilization AFSCs, and some were performing peacetime tasks not related to their wartime utilization. He recommended that the Air Force perform a comprehensive validation of all IMA authorizations.

According to the FMI report, there was inadequate guidance and procedural direction in existing Air Force regulations for management of the IMA program, stemming from the fact that authority for program management had not been delegated below the Office of Air Force Reserve. Operating in an open-ended, unstructured environment, program administrators at all organizational levels had license to define their own programs, causing the evolution of different programs. Some conformed to the purpose of the program and some did not. The Inspector General recommended that a clear vertical structure for program management, administration, and operation be defined and standard procedures developed.

Maj General Richard Bodycombe, appointed Chief of Air Force Reserve in October 1979, resented the inspector's severe criticisms of lack of adequate guidance and procedural direction. General Bodycombe asserted that the Air Force Reserve could not assume total management responsibilities for a program, which, if it were to be successful, required strong active force management at all levels of command. Since IMAs were to fill specific positions in time of war or national emergencies, the active force (i.e., MAJCOMs) had to identify specific mobilization requirements, recruit the reservists to meet them, and train them. General Bodycombe insisted that these functions could not be centralized at the Air Staff level.<sup>62</sup>

Air Staff's reply to the FMI generally supported General Bodycombe's position. The Air Staff working

group, chaired by Maj General William R. Usher, Director of Personnel Plans (HQ USAF/MPX, later DPX), disagreed that the lack of program control was caused by the Office of Air Force Reserve. The group reiterated that the key to a successfully managed mobilization augmentee program included active force leadership and responsibility at all levels of command. They rejected the recommendation that all mobilization resources should be assigned to ARPC for centralized management. Reservists should be assigned to specific active force positions, identified, justified, and approved by the active force. The responsibilities would continue as follows:<sup>63</sup>

- a) HQ USAF/RE would be the focal point for personnel procurements, career management, and program support;
- b) HQ USAF/MP was responsible for identification of wartime manpower requirements, preassignment policies, and job proficiency standards;
- c) MAJCOMs would justify IMA requirements, and supervise, train, use, and recall assigned members; and
- d) ARPC would continue to be charged with day-to-day administrative and personnel support.

The Air Staff agreed that a clearer vertical personnel structure for IMA program management must be developed and that USAF/REP, USAF/MPX, and ARPC would work to improve vertical responsibilities. The Air Staff also agreed that standard procedures for program operations should be established and that changes were in process to revise AFR 35-41, AFR 35-33, and AFR 30-130 to standardize and improve management procedures.

The Air Staff also concurred that the term "training" might be a misnomer and that IMAs should be qualified in the AFSC for which they were assigned; however, technical training and on-the-job training must continue. They added that more definitive training policies would be included in the revision of AFR 35-41, but, because of varying requirements of individual IMA positions, there would continue to be differences in the scope and content of duty-related training between IMA positions.

### **BIMAA Program Established**

Realizing that control over several important portions of the program would remain with MAJCOMs and units, ARPC began an initiative which it felt would enhance IMA management while not diluting MAJCOM control. This was the creation of the Base Individual Mobilization Augmentee Administrator (BIMAA) program, composed of noncommissioned officers from E-6 to E-8. A test of the system was approved, and enlisted reservists on statutory tours (10 USC Section

678) were assigned to four locations with large concentrations of IMAs – the Pentagon and Bergstrom, Scott and MacDill Air Force bases. The prime objective of the BIMAA was to improve the base level program through the education of IMA supervisors, commanders, trainers, and coordinators. To help manage the program at these locations, ARPC developed two new computer-generated management reports – the Mobilization Augmentee Strength Report and Personnel Briefs. The Strength Report listed all IMAs assigned to a location as well as any vacant positions. The Personnel Briefs provided information available at ARPC but previously not available at local CBPOs. The test was running smoothly by the end of 1980. In September 1981, HQ USAF/MPC expanded the program to eight more locations – Brooks, Carswell, Hanscom, Langley, Lowry, Maxwell, McGuire, and Offutt Air Force bases. Ultimately, the program was expanded to several more bases.<sup>64</sup>

### **Air Force Management Assistance Group (AFMAG) Review of Air Force Reserve**

Two years after the FMI, General Robert C. Mathis, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, directed an Air Force Management Assistance Group (AFMAG) review the management structure of the Air Force Reserve. This comprehensive review was conducted between January and April 1982, and even though its focus was on much broader issues than individual program management, its conclusion had far-reaching effects on ARPC and the management structure of the IMA program.

The final report of the AFMAG recommended 249 changes to the Air Force Reserve management structure, several of which proved to be highly controversial and were considered by many members of the Reserve community to be devastating to the Air Force Reserve if ever implemented. After the debates and rebuttals to the AFMAG's allegations settled, very few of the group's recommendations were implemented. One that was implemented, however, was the reinstatement of ARPC as a separate operating agency. (In July 1978, during a major Air Force reorganization, ARPC lost its SOA status and became an organizational element of the Air Force Reserve.)<sup>65</sup>

Specifically, the AFMAG suggested that ARPC revert to SOA status and report to the Headquarters USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel. Previously, as an SOA, ARPC had always received policy direction and guidance from the Chief of Air Force Reserve. General Bodycombe (Chief of Air Force Reserve until his retirement in November 1982) argued against ARPC's commander reporting to USAF/MP. He argued that management of reservists by reservists was key to the Air Force Reserve's success and that reservists had to be managed and serviced differently from active force personnel. Their high priority would be lost under



active force management. His point of view proved persuasive and ARPC remained under AF/RE.<sup>66</sup>

However, USAF/MP was destined to play a much stronger role in the IMA program management structure due to the AFMAG. In regard to the IMA program, the AFMAG final report stated,

...the absence of clearly defined program responsibility and recent authorization turbulence have combined to limit the effectiveness of recruiting support...the greatest weakness associated with the IMA program is the absence of clearly defined recruiting and assignment responsibility... There is no standardization of procedures among the MAJCOMs for enlistment or assignment of individuals into IMA positions.

It also referred to a polarization of attitudes that had developed within the IMA program management community. It alleged that Reserve offices were not exerting aggressive leadership because of the expressed attitude that "...the IMA program is an active duty program and only the active force can fix it..." In turn, MAJCOMs historically have placed more emphasis on active force and reserve unit matters and have not given IMA matters commensurate attention. The group recommended that ARPC work more closely with USAF/MP to ensure that each MAJCOM establish a viable IMA program.

In August 1982, AFR 35-34, Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program, was published. It stated that the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Personnel (DCS/MP), was responsible for overall manpower and personnel policies to validate and manage the IMA program. It also established two working groups:

1) An Air Staff IMA Working Group to provide a forum for integrating policy direction for the IMA program and for discussing IMA policy issues. The group was to meet annually or more frequently if needed. The Directorate of Personnel Plans (AF/MPX) was designated as chair for the group. Membership included several representatives from AF/MP, AF/XO, AF/RE, and other offices. ARPC was to receive informational copies of minutes.

2) An IMA Operational Management Group (OMG) to establish an operational-level forum for the review of IMA policy, procedures, and programs. This group was also to meet annually or more frequently, if needed. The ARPC Mobilization Augmentee Program Management Division (DRM) and the AFMPC Field Activities Management Division (AFMPCYC) were to cochair the group. Membership included several representatives from various MAJCOMs and SOAs – AFIS, AFLC, AFCC, MAC, AFSC, TAC, ESC, PACAF, SAC, ATC, AFOSI, AFRES and other offices.

In May 1983, the new Chief of Air Force Reserve, Maj General Sloan R. Gill, directed that a "Blue Ribbon Committee," made up of nine Reserve general officers,

be formed to look at the IMA program. Their final analysis included an emphatic endorsement that DCS/MP be responsible for overall IMA program management. It stated,<sup>67</sup>

...management of the IMA program rests totally with AF/MP and until that DCS establishes a management group to accept their responsibility as set forth in Air Force regulations, this important program and its valuable assets will continue to flounder—leaderless and open to continual criticism. DCS/MP must accept advocacy, leadership and management of the IMA program.

In November 1983, Maj General Robert C. Oaks, USAF/MPX, acknowledged USAF/MP's responsibilities for IMA program management and informed General Gill that the working group, to be known as the "Air Staff IMA Oversight Committee," was scheduled to meet for the first time in December 1983.<sup>68</sup>

In 1984, USAF/MPX published a revised AFR 35-34, clarifying USAF responsibilities, setting up a central assignment process, and standardizing several management procedures.

### ARPC IMA Task Force, 1987

The 1982 AFMAG was barely history when the IMA program was again brought under scrutiny. During early 1987, several issues surrounding assignment policies and civilian skill utilization were raised from a variety of sources, including the new Chief of Air Force Reserve, Maj General Roger P. Scheer. On 12-13 May 1987, the Honorable Richard E. Carver, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), visited ARPC and expressed concern over certain aspects of the IMA program. Consequently General Scheer approved the request of ARPC commander, Colonel Joseph C. Ramsey, Jr., to establish a task force at ARPC for the specific purpose of reviewing various aspects of the IMA program, including the organizational structure, management, assignment, and control of IMAs.<sup>69</sup>

As well as 12 representatives from ARPC, membership included representatives from several MAJCOMs and the Air Staff. There were three senior IMA consultants, Maj General William Copeland, USAF/RE, Maj General Charles R. Cargill, ATC, and Brig General Boyd L. Eddins, AFLC.

In the task force's final analyses, they reached the same conclusions as did many reviewers before them. The major problem with the IMA program was that there was no single focal point for IMA program management, i.e., no single office that could overlook the functions of all IMA program managers to ensure that all management functions were operating with maximum effectiveness. Their recommendation to resolve this fragmented management was the establishment of a separate directorate at ARPC to serve as that intermedi-

ary single point of contact needed by functional managers. It was to chair the IMA operational management group and would be ARPC's designated representative to the IMA Oversight Committee. (It differed from the already existing Directorate of Individual Reserve Programs at ARPC in that it was to concentrate on issues and policies that affected only IMA usage and concerns.) This recommendation was accepted and the Directorate of IMA Management (ARPC/MA) was established 1 March 1988.<sup>70</sup>

Specifically, General Scheer's major concerns dealt with by the task force were a) can reserve units, as opposed to active duty units, more effectively train and administer IMAs; and b) should IMAs be allowed to have training attachments? In response to General Scheer's question of whether reserve units could, as opposed to active duty units, more effectively train and administer IMAs, the committee responded in the negative. In the committee's opinion, reserve units could not train more effectively based on three findings. First, according to AFR 35-41, entitled "Assignments Within the Reserve Components," IMAs should not be assigned to reserve units that are geographically located farther away than 100 miles. If IMAs were assigned only to reserve units, over 39 percent of the total IMA population would live beyond the 100-mile limitation. Secondly, some MAJCOMs required unique skills of their IMAs, which did not exist in reserve units. For instance, AFLC had 1,594 skills they considered unique to the active force, AFSC considered 1,502 skills unique to their active force program, and ATC considered 103 skills as unique. Overall, there were 5,213 (42 percent) unique skills not found in the reserve units, i.e., training for these skills was not available in the reserve community. It was also the opinion of task force active force membership that active duty support to the IMA program would diminish if MAJCOMs could not directly coordinate training of their IMAs. Thirdly, the task force projected that additional money, manpower, facilities, and equipment would be required of the Reserve to support an increased IMA training workload.

In response to General Scheer's second concern regarding assignment versus attachment, the task force responded that ideally the unit of attachment and unit of assignment should be the same; however, realistically, an attachment option seemed a necessity in the IMA program, and removal of this option would cause significant turmoil as both MAJCOMs and IMAs seemed to prefer it. Historically, the use of intercommand attachment of IMAs began in 1977 and was based on the concept that the IMA resource was a Total Force resource; the responsibility for proficiency training was not just the responsibility of the MAJCOM of assignment, but everyone's responsibility, i.e., other MAJCOMs, ANG, and reserve units should be used as units of attachment for training. This policy permitted expan-

sion of the IMA program to many individuals who wanted to affiliate with the program but whose residential location precluded participation. As of August 1987, excluding the single-managed IMA programs such as AFIS, OSI and ARPC's HC, JA, and SG, 51 percent of the IMA population had an attachment different from their assignment. Sixty-seven percent of this population was attached to training units within their assigned MAJCOMs. The order of priority for choosing a training attachment traditionally was 1) an active duty organization, 2) a reserve element, and 3) an ANG unit. In 1987, 89 percent of enlisted IMAs and 94 percent of officers were attached to an active duty location; nine percent of enlisted IMAs and four percent of officers were attached to reserve units, and the remaining two percent of both enlisted and officers were attached to an ANG element.

To Carver's question—were program managers utilizing civilian skills when making assignments—the task force concluded that generally an individual's primary qualification for an IMA assignment was his/her military skills (AFSC). Reservists' civilian skills and/or education were used only in the assignment process a) when no vacancy existed in their awarded AFSCs, b) when MAJCOMs specifically asked, and c) when members initiated a request for an assignment that related to their civilian skills. However, during their research, the task force discovered that two MAJCOMs (AFSC and AFESC) designed computer systems to utilize civilian skills data when making assignments. Later both systems were tested at ARPC, and the AFSC (Aeronautical Systems Division) version was modified and adopted for use at ARPC to better utilize civilian skills data.

### **Major Policy Change Affecting IMA Funded Levels**

In early December 1987, IMA program managers were faced with a new challenge in the already complicated process of managing IMAs. USAF/PR, Director of Manpower and Organization, directed all IMA program managers to code IMA authorizations as "funded" and "unfunded." According to USAF/PR, the traditional method of coding all authorizations as funded gave a false report of IMA authorization status. It also brought to light the long-existing difference between authorizations and actual funds available to support these authorizations. Until FY 87, this difference was not considered a problem, but, on 10 December 1987, AF/REP, Office of Air Force Reserve, Personnel Division, informed all IMA program managers of congressionally mandated end strength ceilings which made the discrepancy between authorizations and funding vitally important. Each IMA program manager was provided with a baseline funding level prepared by AF/REP, and, even though managers could use their own priorities as to which positions were coded as funded, they were restricted to the overall funding levels provided by AF/

REP. Based on anticipated budgetary decisions by Congress and the Office of Secretary of Defense, AF/REP established a targeted end strength of 12,700. The coding effort was to be completed by the end of December 1987, and meeting the final end strength was to be accom-

plished in FY 88. See Table Seven for a comprehensive look at manning strengths (authorized, assigned, old funding levels and new funding levels) by MAJCOM, SOA, and single managers.<sup>7</sup>

Seventeen IMA program managers had assigned

**Table Seven: IMA Authorizations vs Funded Levels**

Enl	Total	Authorized*			Assigned*			Old Funded*			New Funded**		
		Off	Enl	Total	Off	Enl	Total	Off	Enl	Total	Off		
Air Training Command		180	1,043	1,223	118	502	620	127	513	640	129	523	652
Air University		90	164	254	66	27	93	67	31	98	67	31	98
Alaskan Air Command		11	39	50	4	3	7	5	5	10	5	5	10
Int'l Program Center		11	0	11	8	0	8	9	0	9	9	0	9
Studies & Analyses Ctr		3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	3
Electronic Security Cmd		196	872	1,068	173	520	693	166	574	740	196	514	710
HQ USAF		543	26	569	406	16	422	404	15	419	432	15	447
AF District of Washington		13	13	26	10	2	12	12	7	19	12	7	19
Military Airlift Command		400	509	909	284	140	424	298	96	394	303	86	389
ARPC/SG		1,494	749	2,243	1,188	504	1,692	1,132	475	1,607	1,132	475	1,607
ARPC/HC		450	99	549	410	90	500	348	90	438	348	90	438
ARPC/JA		772	210	982	719	161	880	618	158	776	618	158	776
FEMA		450	150	600	195	81	276	300	100	400	300	100	400
Space Command		101	219	320	71	80	151	64	69	133	64	69	133
Strategic Air Command		178	849	1,027	106	488	594	174	542	716	174	576	750
Tactical Air Command		166	885	1,051	144	589	733	103	459	562	103	459	562
Historical Research Ctr		20	26	46	16	4	20	20	4	24	20	4	24
US Air Forces in Europe		5	68	73	4	27	31	5	30	35	5	20	25
Air Force Academy		3	20	23	1	8	9	3	17	20	3	17	20
AFAFC		12	12	24	12	0	12	12	0	12	12	0	12
Commissary Service		2	2	4	1	0	1	2	0	2	2	0	2
AF Communications Command		55	208	263	73	118	191	60	142	202	70	122	192
AF Elements		537	141	678	448	71	519	213	85	298	275	15	290
AF Engineering & Services Ctr		17	21	38	14	3	17	16	4	20	16	4	20
AF Intelligence Service		1,210	885	2,095	838	401	1,239	840	435	1,275	860	395	1,255
AF Logistics Command		1,091	1,495	2,586	873	807	1,680	1,038	881	1,919	1,053	891	1,944
AF Military Personnel Ctr		7	0	7	7	0	7	7	0	7	7	0	7
AF Ofc of Security Police		8	0	8	7	0	7	8	0	8	8	0	8
AF Ofc of Special Investigations		193	300	493	170	258	428	100	271	371	100	271	371
Hq AF Reserve (AFRES)		256	262	518	247	2	249	222	0	222	222	0	222
AF Svc Info News Center		30	36	66	25	5	30	29	6	35	22	6	28
AF Systems Command		1,253	1,860	3,113	1,141	397	1,538	844	435	1,279	945	325	1,270
HQ ARPC		4	0	4	9	0	9	5	0	5	5	0	5
AF Insp Safety Center		2	2	4	1	0	1	2	0	2	2	0	2

\* As of 1 December 1987

\*\* As of guidance received from AF/REP dated 10 December 1987

strengths over the new funding levels; several were significantly higher. For instance, TAC's new funded level for enlisted personnel was 459, but as of 1 December 1987, TAC had 589 enlisted reservists assigned—an overage of 130. At ARPC, all single managers had assigned personnel over their newly allotted funded levels. ARPC/SG, for instance, had an assigned officer

overage of 56, and an assigned enlisted overage of 29.

The new funded end-strength of 13,230 projected for FY89 brought some relief to IMA program managers. Again, in the fall of 1989, the FY90 funded end-strength was increased slightly to 13,450. During 1988 and 1989 several IMA program managers devoted much time and effort in developing corrective actions to adjust assignments to meet new funded levels.

## Part Five: Role of IMAs in Operation Desert Shield/Storm

The question facing the Air Force in 1990 seemed to be, was the IMA program a viable and necessary war-time program? In an effort to justify its existence during peacetime, did it develop into a peacetime program instead of a program of reservists available and ready immediately for recall in time of war or national emergency? How the IMA program responded to America's involvement in the war in the Middle East during late 1990 and early 1991 possibly answered these questions.

### Operation DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM:

On 2 August 1990, Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait, a tiny, oil rich neighboring nation. Saddam Hussein made threats to further invade neighboring Saudi Arabia. The United Nations condemned this Iraqi act of aggression and demanded that Iraq withdraw its troops from Kuwait. Within the next few days, instead of pulling out of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein annexed Kuwait, rounded up all foreign citizens and placed them as human shields at various strategic locations in Kuwait to inhibit any attempts to kick him out. On 7 August 1990, President George Bush officially declared a national emergency and ordered American troops to the Middle East to counteract the Iraqi invasion. Operation Desert Shield, quickly developed into the largest American military deployment since Vietnam. Over the next few weeks, over 400,000 American military personnel were deployed to the Middle East.

President Bush's objectives for deploying troops were as follows:

- immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government;
- security and stability in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and
- protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.

On 15 January 1991, after all diplomatic attempts to resolve the crisis failed, the war in the Persian Gulf began. Operation Desert Shield became Operation DESERT STORM. A five-week air campaign followed, which in turn was followed by a decisive 100-hour ground war. On 27 February President Bush declared that Kuwait was liberated, Iraq's army was defeated and all US and coalition forces suspended offensive combat operations.

During Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Air Force Reserve, including IMAs, and reserve components of other military services, were called upon to play crucial roles.

### Role of IMAs in DESERT SHIELD/STORM:

Primarily, the Air Force recalled IMAs to active duty to serve as necessary backfill for those active duty personnel that were deployed to the Middle East. The traditional role of the IMA, as defined by AFR 35-34, Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program, is "to meet immediate (M-Day) military needs." Even though M-day, defined as "the day on which mobilization commences or is to commence"<sup>72</sup> did not officially occur until 22 January 1991, the need for IMAs began immediately after President Bush's involvement of American troops in the Middle East. The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC), responsible for the recall of all individual reservists, began receiving requirements from MAJCOMS

**TABLE EIGHT: IMAS ON ACTIVE DUTY BY MAJOR COMMAND AS OF 21 AUGUST 1990**

Major Command	Officer	Enlisted
TAC	17	22
AFCOMS	1	-
AFIA	79	35
SAC	2	2
MAC	4	-
ESC	-	4
AFLC	10	8
AFSC	3	-
AFESC	4	-
AFELMS	17	4
OSI	-	2
SG (ARPC)	3	1
HC (ARPC)	2	2
JA (ARPC)	3	4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>84</b>

for IMAs early in August. With no mobilization authority officially given that early in the contingency, many IMAs were asked to voluntarily come on active duty under authority 10 USC 672d. (This authority provides the fastest and most flexible use of volunteer forces prior to an expected mobilization.) Within ten days of the President's declaration of national emergency, 216 IMAs (139 officers and 77 enlisted) were on active duty under authority 10 USC 672d.

By 21 August 1990, 14 days after the contingency began, 229 IMAs were voluntarily on active duty under authority 10 USC 672d. For a breakdown of those IMAs by MAJCOM, see Table Eight.<sup>73</sup>

The number of IMAs recalled according to their Duty Air Force Specialty Code (DAFSC) can be seen on the following table:

**TABLE NINE: IMAS RECALLED BY AFSC**

AS OF 21 AUGUST 1990

Number Recalled	DAFSC	TITLE (Officer)	CAREER FIELD
2	0076	Planning & Programming Officer	--
5	1911	Operations Mgt Staff Officer	--
2	1941	Disaster Preparedness Officer	--
9	1916	Operations Mgt Staff Officer	--
4	0910	Air Attache	SPECIAL DUTY
1	4016	Maintenance Staff Officer	LOGISTICS
1	4024	Aircraft Maintenance Officer	LOGISTICS
2	6016	Transportation Staff Officer	LOGISTICS
2	6054	Transportation Officer	LOGISTICS
5	6216	Services Staff Officer	LOGISTICS
2	6224	Services Operations Officer	LOGISTICS
2	6416	Supply Mgt Staff Officer	LOGISTICS
3	6616	Logistics Plans/Programs Staff Officer	LOGISTICS
3	6624	Logistics Plans/Programs Offcr	LOGISTICS
1	7024	Information Management, Exec Officer	INFO-MGT
2	7911	Public Affairs Staff Offr	PUBLIC-AFFAIRS
1	8011*	Intel Plans/Programs Staff Offr	INTELLIGENCE
4	8016*	Intel Plans/Programs Officer	INTELLIGENCE
5	8025*	Human Resources Intel Officer	INTELLIGENCE
2	8035*	Signals Intelligence Officer	INTELLIGENCE
1	8045*	Imagery Intelligence Officer	INTELLIGENCE
1	8065*	Mapping, Charting & Geodesy Ofr	INTELLIGENCE
2	8071*	Intelligence Applications Offr	INTELLIGENCE
51	8075*	Intelligence Applications Offr	INTELLIGENCE
12	8085*	Combat Targeting Officer	INTELLIGENCE
2	8096*	Intelligence Director	INTELLIGENCE
3	8116*	Security Police Staff Officer	SEC-POLICE
2	8124*	Security Police Officer	SEC-POLICE
2	8816	Judge Advocate, Staff	LEGAL
1	8824	Judge Advocate	LEGAL
1	8911	Staff Chaplain	CHAPLAIN
1	8924	Chaplain	CHAPLAIN
1	9016*	Health Serv Administrator, Staff	MEDICAL
1	9736*	Operating Room Nurse	MEDICAL
1	9756*	Clinical Nurse	MEDICAL
1	1425Y	Air Operations Officer, Pilot, Transport/Airlift (General)	
3	1495Y	Air Operations Officer, Pilot, Other (General)	
1	4054A	Munitions Officer (Munitions)	

Number Recalled	DAFSC	TITLE (Enlisted)	CAREER FIELD
2	20150*	Intelligence Ops Spec I	INTELLIGENCE
2	20151*	Target Intel Spec I	INTELLIGENCE
12	20170*	Intelligence Ops Techn	INTELLIGENCE
2	20171*	Target Intel Techn	INTELLIGENCE
4	20199*	Intel Ops & Targeting Supvr	INTELLIGENCE
1	20250*	Radio Comm Anal Spec I	INTELLIGENCE
4	20600*	Intel Ops & Exploitation Mgt	INTELLIGENCE
3	20650*	Imagery Interpreter Spec I	INTELLIGENCE
4	20670*	Imagery Interpreter Techn	INTELLIGENCE
3	24250	Disaster Preparedness Spec 1	SAFETY
2	24270	Disaster Preparedness Techn	SAFETY
1	24290	Disaster Preparedness Supt	SAFETY
1	49171	Comm-Computer Systems Supvr	COMM-COMPUTER SYSTEMS
2	62300	Services Mgr	SERVICES
1	62350	Services Spec I	SERVICES
1	62370	Services Supvr	SERVICES
1	62390	Services Supt	SERVICES
1	64571	Materiel Storage & Distr Supvr	SUPPLY
1	66100	Logistics Plans Mgr	LOGISTICS
1	66190	Logistics Plans Supt	LOGISTICS
2	70250	Information Management Spec I	INFO-MGT
6	70270	Information Management Techn	INFO-MGT
1	73270	Personnel Technician	PERSONNEL
2	81150*	Security Spec I	SEC-POLICE
6	81152*	Law Enforcement Spec I	SEC-POLICE
4	81170*	Security Supvr	SEC-POLICE
5	81172*	Law Enforcement Supvr	SEC-POLICE
1	81199*	Security Police Supt	SEC-POLICE
1	82170	Special Investigations Techn	SPEC-INVEST
1	82190	Special Investigations Supt	SPEC-INVEST
2	88150	Paralegal Spec I	PARALEGAL
2	88170	Paralegal Techn	PARALEGAL
1	89350	Chapel Management Spec I	CHAPEL-MGT
1	89370	Chapel Management Techn	CHAPEL-MGT
1	90270*	Medical Service Techn	
1	A20872A	Aircrew, Linguistic Techn	
1	A20899	Aircrew, Cryptologic Linguist Supt	

\* Critical Skill AFSC (see Ltr dated 18 Jan 91, HQ ARPC/XPQ, F. Ratliff to ARPC/RC)

On 7 September 1990, President Bush invoked 10 USC 673b (known as the 200K recall) which gave the President authority to call up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (Guard/Reserve Unit personnel and IMAs from all military services) for a period of 180 days. Under authority 10 USC 673b, 464 more IMAs (325 officers and 139 enlisted) were involuntarily ordered to active duty.<sup>74</sup> Because military experts projected high casualties if war erupted, a high percentage of these IMAs carried medical AFSCs.

Shortly following the activation of 10 USC 673b, STOP/LOSS authority 10 USC 673c, was invoked, effective 17 September 1990. This authority allowed the President to suspend certain laws relating to promotion, retirement, and separation. (See Table Ten for a breakdown of the number of IMAs affected by STOP/LOSS.) Seventy officer AFSCs (18 percent of the 377 IMA officer

AFSCs) were affected under this STOP/LOSS authority which involved 1,132 officers. Ninety-four AFSCs (22 percent of the 436 enlisted AFSCs) were affected by STOP/LOSS involving 2,363 enlisted personnel.<sup>75</sup>

On 22 January 1991, partial mobilization authority 10 USC 673 went into effect. Hundreds more IMAs were called into service to support Desert Storm. All IMAs on active duty under authority 10 USC 673b and most IMAs in voluntary status under 10 USC 672d were flipped to 10 USC 673 on 1 February 1991.

On 5 March 1991, six days after President Bush called for a cessation of hostilities, there were 2,498 IMAs (1,238 enlisted, 1,260 officers) serving on active duty. See Table Eleven for a breakdown of IMAs on active duty by MAJCOM.<sup>76</sup> (The final total of IMAs recalled to active duty for Desert Storm came to 2,663 [1,365 officers, 1,298 enlisted].)

**TABLE TEN: NUMBER OF IMAS AFFECTED BY STOP/LOSS**

<u>OFFICER</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>	
AFSC TITLE	NO. of IMAS AFFECTED	AFSC TITLE	NO. of IMAS AFFECTED
Air Attache	1	Intelligence	123
Pilot	18	Disaster Preparedness	138
Navigator	5	Comm.Control Sys Ops	25
Aircraft Maint Off	1	Manned Aerospace Maint	208
Civil Engineer Off	1	Munitions & Weapons	24
Intelligence	507	Vehicle Maint	8
Health Svc Mgmt	71	Comm Computer Sys	1
Biomedical Science	82	Mechanical/Electrical	60
Physician	132	Structural/Pavements	38
Nurse	314	Sanitation	20
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,132</b>	Fire Protection	156
		Transportation	166
		Services	75
		Logistics Plans	2
		Security Police	1,075
		Medical	144
		Dental	14
		Aircrew, Intelligence	10
		Aircrew, Medical	6
		Tech Training Instructors	52
		Postal Specialist	1
		Other	4
		Unknown	13
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,363</b>




**TABLE ELEVEN: IMAS ON ACTIVE DUTY AS OF 5 MARCH 1991**

MAJOR COMMAND	OFFICER	ENLISTED	TOTAL
AFIA	36	13	49
AFOSP	-	1	1
USAFA	8	14	22
USAFE	31	28	59
AFLC	72	44	116
AFSC	107	19	126
ATC	165	136	301
AU	4	-	4
USAF	1	-	1
MAC	189	84	273
SAC	160	230	390
TAC	373	589	962
ESC	12	28	40
AFSOC	7	5	12
AFSPACECOM	4	14	18
AFESC	7	2	9
AFELMS	83	31	114
JT MIL MED CMD	1	-	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1,260</b>	<b>1,238</b>	<b>2,498</b>

Over half of these IMAs were in medical career fields. See Table Twelve for a breakdown of recalled IMAs by career fields.<sup>77</sup> Of the 1,325 IMAs recalled with medical

AFSCs, the majority were sent to TAC medical facilities located on 17 different bases (303 officers, 182 enlisted) and ATC medical facilities, primarily Wilford Hall Medical Center located at Lackland AFB, Texas (147 officer, 124 enlisted).

**TABLE TWELVE:  
CAREER FIELDS OF MOBILIZED IMAS**



**Delay/Exemption Process:**

On all orders under 10 USC 673b (200K recall) and 10 USC 673 (partial mobilization), information was given to IMAs defining the process for postponement of entry onto active duty. Of the 2,663 IMAs recalled, 136 submitted to ARPC's Directorate of Personnel, Personnel Programs Division, Discharge Branch (ARPC/DPAD), requests for delays or exemptions, i.e., 5.1 percent of those reservists recalled. ARPC/DPAD recommended ap-

proval of 96 requests (36 delays, 60 exemptions) and denied 40 requests. For a breakdown of the reasons for those requests and ARPC's response to them, see Table Thirteen.<sup>78</sup>

**TABLE THIRTEEN: REQUESTS FOR DELAYS/ EXEMPTIONS**

Reason	No. of Requests	Approved	Denied
Medical	35	34	1
Hardship:			
Personal	33	15	18
Community	8	2	6
Dependent			
Care	20	6	14
School	16	15	1
Miscellaneous	24	24	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>40</b>

A large portion of IMAs requesting delays (see Personal Hardships in above table) asked only for a few days' delay in order to get their affairs in order. Even though mobilization policy states that, whenever possible, members should be given reasonable advanced notice before they must report,<sup>79</sup> no IMAs were pre-alerted for possible activation. Over 57 percent of all IMAs recalled had less than seven days' notice to report to active duty. Another 35 percent had only 8-14 days notice to report.


The number of delays/exemptions was very low when placed in historical context. During the 1961 Berlin crisis, over 3,000 members of the Ready and Standby Reserves were called to active duty. These reservists were given at least 30 days from initial notification to report to active duty. Over 21 percent of them, in spite of the 30 days' notice, requested delays or exemptions.<sup>80</sup>

**HQ ARPC Surveyed Recalled IMAs:**

Understanding that for the first time in the history of the IMA program an in-depth, hands-on evaluation of the IMA program could be made in a true, wartime mobilization, HQ ARPC program managers designed and mailed a survey to all IMAs mobilized as well as to their commanders and/or supervisors. The surveys were mailed in April and results from those surveys compiled and analyzed in May and June 1991. The response rate from both groups was excellent. Over 59 percent of the IMAs completed and returned the surveys, and over 135 percent of the commanders and supervisors returned their surveys. (Many unit commanders chose to duplicate their surveys and have supervisors who worked closer to the IMAs also complete them. Consequently, HQ ARPC received more surveys from commanders than mailed.) Since the IMA response rate was so high, and the survey response population so closely mirrored the mobilized population (See Table Fourteen), HQ ARPC program managers felt the survey results could appropriately be applied to the whole of the mobilized IMA population.<sup>81</sup>

The survey results documenting the experiences of the IMAs in Desert Shield/Desert Storm satisfied many long-unanswered questions regarding the IMA program. Among those were:


- o Can IMAs fulfill critical functions of their active duty counterparts who have been deployed in time of war?
- o Are IMAs receiving adequate peacetime training that will prepare them for their wartime responsibilities?
- o Can they be considered a viable resource to augment the active force *immediately* in time of war or national emergency?
- o Can IMAs be attached for training at one



**TABLE FIFTEEN:**

**ASSIGNMENTS**

IMAs were mobilized to...



location during peacetime and yet still function adequately at a different assignment during wartime?

o Can an IMA mobilization be carried out successfully in spite of the complexity of a fragmented management structure crossing both reserve and active duty lines?

The answers to these very crucial questions seemed to be in the affirmative based on survey findings.

Regarding assignments and utilization, survey results pointed out that only 29 percent of all mobilized IMAs were sent to their assigned wartime positions (See Table Fifteen). Over one-third of all mobilized IMAs were sent to a different MAJCOM due to the complexities of this particular Middle Eastern war. However,

according to 87 percent of all mobilized IMAs, their peacetime training reasonably well or fully prepared them for their wartime duties (See Table Sixteen). In spite of not being sent to their assigned wartime positions, 83 percent felt they were adequately utilized in the duty AFSC.

Their commanders and supervisors overwhelmingly endorsed the use of IMAs during the contingency. Over 90 percent stated that IMAs were adequately trained to perform their wartime responsibilities; over 96 percent rated IMA performance as either good or very good (See Table Seventeen); and 97 percent of all commanders surveyed said IMAs contributed to their command's wartime mission.


IMAs were prepared and ready for mobilization. Over 95 percent of all IMAs recalled had planned for possible mobilization and had made adequate dependent care arrangements prior to recall. Of that 95 percent, over 96 percent felt their plans worked. Only 5.1 percent requested delays or exemptions and one quarter of those only requested delays of a few days in order to get their affairs in order.

Regarding integration into the active force, 95 percent felt they, as reservists, were well, or fairly well, received by the active force personnel. Even though over 15 percent had junior-in-grade active duty supervisors, only one percent felt this situation was a problem.

According to survey results, the overall mobilization process was successful. Almost 95 percent of all IMAs recalled reported to their active duty locations in the time specified, which in most cases was less than 14 days from notification. In spite of the complexities of transfer-




**TABLE SIXTEEN:**

**PEACETIME TRAINING**  
IMAs felt their peacetime training...



ring individual reservists' records from the reserve pay system (ARPAS) to the active duty pay system (JUMPS), over 94 percent of the mobilized IMAs received their first paycheck within 30 days of reporting to active duty (See Table Eighteen). (Only six percent commented on the surveys that their pay was late.) In spite of the fact

that over 92 percent of all mobilized reservists had less than 14 days notice to report, over one-third received their orders prior to departing for active duty and another 59 percent either had their orders waiting for them at their assigned locations or received their orders shortly thereafter (See Table Nineteen).



## IMA Profiles from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM:

Who were these IMAs that filled such critical roles during Desert Shield/Desert Storm? The following personal profiles, randomly selected, provide glimpses of the various and complex roles IMAs played in this war.

**STAFF SERGEANT ANTHONY H. STEENSGAARD** is a security specialist (DAFSC 81150) both attached for training and assigned to March AFB, California. He first agreed to do a voluntary assignment of active duty under authority 10 USC 672d. He was assigned to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, from September through December 1990 as a security specialist. Six weeks after finishing this assignment, (during which time he was married), SSgt Steensgaard was recalled involuntarily under 10 USC 673 and reported to Malmstrom AFB, Great Falls, Montana, on 20 February 1991. At Malmstrom AFB, he was assigned to the Security Police Investigations Section. All but one active duty member of this section had been deployed to the Middle East. His responsibilities entailed investigating cases of fraud, child abuse, theft and drugs.

SSgt Steensgaard lives in El Centro, California. For three years prior to his recall, he worked as a border patrol agent with the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service. His primary responsibility was patrolling the U.S. border from San Diego, California, to Yuma, Arizona, to prevent illegal aliens, drugs, and firearms from crossing into the United States. After his deactivation from active duty on 31 May 1991, he returned to that position. SSgt Steensgaard is a career reservist, serving first with the Alaskan Air Guard, 1985-1988, and secondly, with the IMA program, 1988 to present.



Staff Sergeant Anthony H. Steensgaard (Left)



Master Sergeant Robert A. Cargel

**MASTERSERGEANT ROBERT A. CARGEL** is a Medical Service Technician (DAFSC 90270) attached for training at Macdill AFB which is near his home in Tampa, Florida. His wartime assignment is to Wright-Patterson Medical Center.

When Desert Shield began, he volunteered for active duty and served from September 1990 until the end of January 1991 at Macdill AFB. The day after finishing his five month voluntary duty, he received notification to report within three days to Wright Patterson AFB, under authority 10 USC 673. (MSgt Cargel was fully aware of the possibility of his involuntary mobilization and had made adequate dependent care arrangements for his family prior to recall.)

MSgt Cargel was the front area supervisor for the Primary Care Clinic during Desert Storm from 4 February until 17 August 1991. This position involved clinical staff scheduling, coordinating patient appointments between the emergency room and clinic, overseeing

drug and medical supply inventories, and scheduling ambulance and medical bus transportation to and from the clinic from medical air evacuation location.

MSgt Cargel has served as an IMA in the Reserve since 1978. (He served four years on active duty from 1964-1968.) He received his medical technician training at Shephard AFB as a crewmember on the C-9a medical evacuation aircraft. His civilian occupation is building large mainframe computers for General Telephone of Florida. General Telephone held his civilian position open while he was on active duty during Desert Storm.

LT COLONEL SALLY ANN EAVES is a Transportation Staff Officer (DAFSC 6016) both attached for training and assigned to the Technology and Industrial Support Directorate of the Ogden Air Logistics Center located at Hill AFB. Throughout the first half of 1990, Lt Col Eaves was asked on several occasions to come to Hill AFB to act as Chief, Transportation Unit, Distribution Division, during the absence of the active duty incumbent. (For several years, Lt Col Eaves had worked closely with the active duty division chief during her annual tours.) In July 1990 the division chief retired, and it was critical that this position be filled. The directorate was undergoing a major reorganization and needed a division chief in place to provide coverage and continuity of operations. Consequently, Lt Col Eaves volunteered to serve as division chief from 15 July to 1 October 1990.

Lt Col Eaves consequently directed the efforts of the 500 personnel transportation division during the first few months of Desert Shield. Under her supervision, the division's mobility operations deployed over 1,200 personnel and 4,500 tons of unit cargo to the Persian Gulf via MAC airlift and civilian contract carriers. Over 300,000 pounds of cargo were shipped by surface modes. Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC)'s own cargo airlines (LOGAIR) operations increased to a daily rate of 160-200 percent of normal operations. Under her direction, an Air Terminal Operations Center (ATOC) was established in the LOGAIR terminal to meet the needs of an Aerial Port of Embarkation. After Desert Shield began, in addition to her regular duties as division chief, she was a member of the directorate battle staff representing the division. This duty required reporting to the control center each morning at 0630 to review message traffic and attending daily briefings on events of war and how those events affected Hill AFB. Because of her overall performance during 1990, including her involvement in Desert Shield operations, Lt Col Eaves received the AFLC Outstanding Officer IMA of the Year Award in April 1991.

Lt Col Eaves was commissioned as an officer in the Air Force in 1967 and served over nine years on active duty. She transferred to the Reserve and entered the IMA program in 1976.

In civilian life, Lt Col Eaves is a homemaker.

COLONEL, CHAPLAIN ANDREW R. RIENSTRA is a Staff Chaplain (DAFSC 8916) attached to Air Force Chief of Chaplains in Washington, D.C. for training. His IMA assigned wartime position was to become the senior chaplain at Andrews AFB; however, when Desert Storm broke out in January the senior chaplain at Carswell AFB, Texas, was deployed to Germany, and Colonel Rienstra was asked to report to Carswell AFB instead of Andrews AFB. He was called on 4 February and told to report to active duty under authority 10 USC 673 no later than 12 February. He was the only IMA chaplain called on active duty to become an installation's staff chaplain.

When not in uniform, Colonel, Chaplain Rienstra is the senior pastor of the First Reformed Church of Pompton Plains, N.J. and has been for nine years. With two associate pastors working with him capable of covering his responsibilities there in Pompton Plains, he was able to leave quickly for Carswell AFB. However, during his five month stay (he was demobilized 31 July) at Carswell AFB, he continued to prepare his home church's weekly newsletter and send it home for publication.



Lt Colonel Sally Ann Eaves



Colonel, Chaplain Andrew R. Rienstra

As Carswell's staff chaplain, Colonel, Chaplain Rienstra supervised a staff of 23 – seven active duty chaplains, seven Reserve chaplains, six chapel management personnel, two religious educational coordinators and one civilian secretary. Other responsibilities included acting as the pastoral contact with the wing commanders and deputy commanders, taking part in worship services, and visiting hospitals and units.


**MASTER SERGEANT DAVID W. DEVOL** is a Chapel Management Technician (AFSC 89370) attached to Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He was considered as an ATC resource with an assigned wartime position at Lackland AFB, Texas. However, MSgt Devol was notified on 6 February to report to Carswell AFB under authority 10 USC 673 no later than 12 February to serve as the NCOIC for Resource Management (His active duty counterpart had deployed to Europe) in the



Master Sergeant David W. Devol

Chaplain's Office. Personnel in ARPC/HC, however, had telephoned MSgt Devol earlier and advised him that mobilization was imminent. Consequently, he and his family were prepared for his recall.

In civilian life, MSgt Devol is a data base administrator for an Omaha software company. He has been in the IMA program since August 1984. From 1975 to 1984 MSgt Devol served on active duty and was an NCOIC at several Air Force locations. He definitely felt he was adequately utilized, was received well by the active duty staff at Carswell AFB, and, since his family was not with him, he was able to devote much more time to carrying out the functions of NCOIC, many days working from early morning until 9:00-10:00 p.m. in the evenings. When the active duty Chief of Chapel Support Activities was not available, MSgt Devol carried out the functions of that position as well as his own responsibilities. He was deactivated 21 April 1991.



Major James V. Hennessey

**MAJOR JAMES V. HENNESSEY** is a physician specializing in Internal Medicine and Endocrinology (DAFSC 9386) from Beaver Creek, Ohio. He is both attached for training and assigned to Wright-Patterson Medical Center in Dayton. He was notified on 26 January to report to active duty under authority 10 USC 673 no later than 4 February 1991.

Prior to Desert Storm, Doctor Hennessey's usual reserve training duties included teaching at the medical center. He made weekly trips to the medical center to teach and supervise active duty medical students and residents as well as medical students from the Wright State University School of Medicine who rotated regularly through the Wright-Patterson Medical Center. (He carried the same academic responsibilities at four other hospitals in the Dayton area in his private practice.) When he was activated, the above teaching activities

became a part of his full-time responsibilities as physician in both the Internal Medicine and Endocrinology clinics. He was deactivated on 8 April 1991.

**LT COLONEL CHARLES R. HOLLIDAY** is a Tropical/Middle East Product Management Officer (DAFSC 2524) attached for training in the Forecasting Services Division of the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC) located at Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He is assigned to Headquarters Air Weather Service at Scott AFB, Illinois.



Lt Colonel Charles R. Holliday

Lt Col Holliday was serving his annual tour (2-15 August 1990) at Offutt AFB when Desert Shield began. Because current expertise in Middle East meteorology was severely limited, he remained at Offutt AFB, either on MPA man-days or completing IDT's (16-22 August and 7 January - 15 February) until he was activated 16 February 1991. Lt Col Holliday provided key weather analysis and satellite interpretation training to AFGWC active duty personnel who were deployed to the Middle East Theater as well as provided additional training to a pool of AFGWC personnel possibly needed for future deployment. He provided seminars to over 100 AFGWC forecasters, section chiefs, branch chiefs, and others needed in CONUS to support personnel in the Middle East Theater. Along with these training responsibilities, Lt Col Holliday provided daily, in-depth quality reviews of all Desert Shield/Storm products, discussions, analyses, and case studies. Because of his extensive background with the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program special sensor microwave imagery operations, he became the leading expert in the nation in putting it to use in support of Desert Storm. Previously tested only over water, he found that weather satellite microwave imagery could be used over desert land masses to detect rainfall rates and soil conditions so important to ground troop movements.

As a civilian, Lt Col Holliday is employed with the State Department's Agency for International Development in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. He is a nationally recognized expert in the field of tropical weather analysis and forecast applications. Because of

his overall performance during 1990, including his involvement in Desert Shield operations, Lt Col Holliday received the Outstanding Officer IMA of the Year for 1990 for Air Weather Service.

**MASTER SERGEANT KATHERINE K. DURAM** is a Medical Services Technician (DAFSC 90270) attached to Lowry AFB, Primary Care Clinic, for training. She is assigned in a wartime scenario to the Air Force Academy contingency hospital, Colorado Springs, Colorado. However, during Desert Storm, she agreed to come on active duty voluntarily under 10 USC 672d to serve as the Assistant to the Chief of Medical Readiness and Mobilization Division, Directorate of Health Services Individual Reserve Programs, Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC/SG). Her primary responsibilities at ARPC/SG included assisting in the administrative process of mobilizing Individual Ready Reservists (IRR) and retired regular members to active duty, finding replacements for those reservists granted exemption from active duty, and reviewing involuntary tour dates.

In civilian life, MSgt Duram is a paralegal. The week before being recalled, she graduated from the Denver Paralegal Institute and was to begin full-time employment with a Denver based law firm the same day she reported for active duty. The law firm is holding her position until she is deactivated, scheduled for 30 September 1991.

MSgt Duram has been a member of the IMA program for three years. She joined the Air Force Reserve in 1980 and served until 1988 as a category A reservist with the 419th TAC Hospital at Hill AFB.



Master Sergeant Katherine K. Duram



**COLONEL WESLEY E. LERDON**, from Columbus, Ohio, is a Health Services Administrator Staff Officer (DAFSC 9016) both attached for training and assigned to Wright-Patterson Medical Center in Dayton, Ohio. He was notified on 26 January to report to active duty by 4 February 1991 as a member of a Military Patient Administration Team (MPAT). MPATs are composed of six military personnel who travel between hospitals in their respective areas providing administrative support for military casualties. Col Lerdon not only functioned as a health services administrator, but was heavily used as well at the medical center in his secondary AFSC 5516, as a Civil Engineer Staff Officer. In order for the medical center to function as a contingency hospital in a wartime scenario, it needed more bed space. Col Lerdon, using his civil engineering expertise, located 55,000 square feet of unimproved space (in the basement of the medical center) which could be converted with moderate renovation, into office space. Office functions located on upper floors could then be moved to the lower level, freeing up the upper floors for hospital bed space. Col Lerdon was able to locate more available bed space in several other buildings on base. He is heavily involved in the design and reconstruction of this space for hospital use.

Col Lerdon, an engineer in civilian life, has owned his own industrial design company since 1976. One function of that company is the design of medical products and facilities. Col Lerdon was able to apply his industrial design capabilities to the medical center's renovation efforts to create more bed space.

He has been a member of the IMA program since December 1982.



Colonel Wesley E. Lerdon



First Lieutenant W. Lee Rowan, Jr

**FIRST LIEUTENANT W. LEE ROWAN, JR.**, is a Health Services Administrator (DAFSC 9021) attached to the Lowry AFB Clinic for training and assigned to Offutt AFB in a wartime setting. In November 1990, he agreed to come on active duty voluntarily under 10 USC 672d as a Health Services Administrator to manage the volunteer medical program for ARPC's Directorate of Health Services Individual Reserve Programs. During Desert Storm, he supervised a six-member ARPC/SG team responsible for the directorate's involuntary recall program. His responsibilities included coordinating back-fill requirements with ARPC/SG, MAJCOMs, and USAF/SG; overseeing PDS transactions that produced computer generated orders; investigating and substantiating tour dates for specialty pays; and tracking demo-


bilization activities. He is scheduled for deactivation on 30 September 1991.

Prior to recall, 1st Lt Rowan was a full-time student at the University of Colorado in Denver working toward his graduate degree in business administration. 1st Lt Rowan served on active duty from August 1978 until August 1982 at which time he joined the Air Force Reserve and accepted a position in the IMA program.

**CAPTAIN EDWARD (SKIP) BRUHN** is an Intelligence Applications Officer assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Support Agency (AFISA). He is attached for training to Intelligence Reserve Detachment 4 located on Lowry AFB, Colorado. His "M-Day" assignment was to HQ Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colorado. When Desert Shield began, he was asked to do a special tour, 17-28 September, to support HQ MAC/INXS at Scott AFB, Illinois.

In late January 1991, he was notified to report to Ft Belvoir, Virginia, no later than 27 January, under authority 10 USC 673b. (He was later flipped to authority 10 USC 673.) On 2 February he was deployed to the Middle East to support HQ US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF), Intelligence Systems Division, at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. At HQ USCENTAF, he was assigned to the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) as the Small Computer Intelligence Data Base Manager, where he helped maintain and transmit order of battle information to flying units of coalition forces. Working with other personnel in the Division, Captain Bruhn built and implemented several crucially needed order of battle databases, including ground, air, and anti-aircraft artillery, on stand-alone small computers using commercially available software. He then worked on development of transition software to allow these databases to run on the facility's hardware suite. While on duty in Riyadh, Captain Bruhn, as well as all other American military personnel, were exposed to frequent Scud attacks. Captain Bruhn returned to the states 29 March and was released from active duty 5 April 1991.

In civilian life, Captain Bruhn is a project officer and contracting officer's representative (GM-13) for the Department of Defense Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS), located at Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Denver, Colorado. He served on active duty from 1967-1975 at which time he joined the IMA program.



Captain Edward (Skip) Bruhn

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Army Air Forces Plan for the Air Reserve, 12 July 1946, 1-3.

<sup>2</sup>Monograph, The Air Force Reserve Program: Changes and Reorganizations, 1946-1964, Director of Historical Services, HQ ConAC, no date, Part B, 2.

<sup>3</sup>Warren, Major William K. and Cantwell, Gerald T. Individual Service in the Air Force Reserve (DRAFT), Oct 89, 4-5.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>5</sup>Memorandum for Mr. Forrestal from Gordon Gray, Synopsis of Major Recommendations of the Gray Board, 2 Jul 48; Cantwell, Gerald T. History of the Air Force Reserve: The Air Reserve Technician Program--Its Antecedents and Evolution (1948-1978), Feb 79, 1.

<sup>6</sup>Monograph, The Air Force Reserve Program: Changes and Reorganizations, 1946-1964, Part C.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Monograph, The Air Force Reserve Program: Changes and Reorganizations, 1946-1964, Part A, 2.

<sup>9</sup>Cantwell, Gerald T. History of the Air Force Reserve: The Air Reserve Technician Program--Its Antecedents and Evolution (1948-1978), 5.

<sup>10</sup>Warren, William K. Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program (DRAFT), May 87, 18-20; ADC Ltr 45-11, Executive Order #10007, 25 Oct 48, 1 attachment, Executive Order #10007, President Harry S. Truman, 15 Oct 48.

<sup>11</sup>Cantwell, 5; Report of the Smith Committee, 27 Jul 51, 27-47.

<sup>12</sup>Col Carroll S. Geddes, "What About the Match-Merge Program?", Air Force Magazine, Vol 40, No. 6, Jun 57, 103; Warren, 23-24.

<sup>13</sup>1957 Air Reserve Records Center (ARRC) History, 50-51.

<sup>14</sup>1956 Jul-Dec ARRC History, 88-99; Ltr, USAF/MP to Commander, ConAC, Selective Assignment of Reservists, 26 Jul 54.

<sup>15</sup>Warren, 22-23; Briefing on Selective Assignment Program and Reserve Mobilization Requirement Program, ARPC, 28 Jun 56; 1956 Jul-Dec ARRC History, 88-99.

<sup>16</sup>Assignment and Procurement Procedures for Major Command War Augmentation Requirement for Individuals, no date (SD-42 to Jan-Jun 1957 ARRC History); ConAC Supplement of USAF Plan for Alignment and Manning of War Augmentation Requirement, no date, 1 (SD-67 to Jan-Jun 1957 ARRC History).

<sup>17</sup>Warren and Cantwell, 19-20; ConAC Letter 45-3, Assignment and Control of Individual Mobilization Positions, 16 Jun 61; Staff Study, Analysis and Documentation of MOB Alignment WPR 62-63; H. Cape, 3 Nov 60.

<sup>18</sup>Warren and Cantwell, 20-21.

<sup>19</sup>Warren, 24, 26-28.

<sup>20</sup>Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Under Secretary Malcolm A. MacIntyre, Air Force Reserve Manpower Ceiling, 1 Jun 59.

<sup>21</sup>"The Air Reserve Forces...New Roles in a New Era," Report of the Reserve Forces Review Group (Smith Committee), Nov 59.

<sup>22</sup>Warren, 27-28; 1960 Jul-Dec ARRC History, 12-13; "Plan for Revised Management of the Air Reserve Forces," The Air Reservist, Vol XII, No. 6, Jun-Jul 60, 2-14.

<sup>23</sup>ARPC Staff Study-Analysis and Documentation of MOB Alignment WPR 62/63, ARPCPOQ to COMD, 3 Nov 60, attachment B.

<sup>24</sup>"Plan for Revised Management of the Air Reserve Forces," Vol XII, No. 6, Jun-Jul 60, 2-14; Warren, 29.

<sup>25</sup>ConAC Letter 45-3, Assignment and Control of Individual Mobilization Positions, 16 Jun 61; 1961 Jan-Jun ARRC History, 84-85; The Air Reservist, Vol XII, No. 6, Jun-Jul 60, 2-14.

<sup>26</sup>Warren and Cantwell, 24-27.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>28</sup>Simons, Roma K. ARPC 30 Year History, 22.

<sup>29</sup>Cantwell, Gerald T. History of Air Force Reserve, The Evolution and Employment of the Air Force Reserve as a Mobilization Force (1946-1980), 127-128.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 172-175.

<sup>31</sup>AFR Proposal for Improved Management of the Individual Program, 11 Oct 69 (Part of SSS, Lt Col Norman E. Ney, 22 Sep 69); Warren and Cantwell, 35.

<sup>32</sup>The Honorable J. William Doolittle was appointed as the Asst Sec of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and Major General Tom E. Marchbanks, Jr., was assigned as Chief of Air Force Reserve.

<sup>33</sup>ARPC History, 1 Jan-31 Jul 1968, 3.

<sup>34</sup>ARPC History, Jul 74-Jun 75, 5-7.

<sup>35</sup>Warren, 35.

<sup>36</sup>ARPC History, Jul 69-Jun 70, 183-186; History of Office of Air Force Reserve 1 Jan-30 Jun 70, excerpts; Staff Summary Sheet, Lt Col Norman E. Ney, Air Force Individual Training Program Study, 22 Sep 69, with Attachments: Air Force Proposal for Improved Management of the Individual Programs, no date, Memorandum for the Vice Chief of Staff from Theodore Marrs, 17 Oct 68; and Ltr to XDC and OT from PRP-P, AFTOR Proposal for Administration of the Individual Programs, 28 Jul 69.

<sup>37</sup>ARPC History, Jul 74-Jun 75, 6.

<sup>38</sup>ARPC History, Jul 74-Jun 75, 5; Memo, USAF/RET to AFRES/CC, ARPC/RPCC, Individual Reserve Resource Management Project, 22 Dec 70; Report, ARPC/HO for MO, Background Information on ARPC's Air Reserve Squadrons, 1-2.

<sup>39</sup>ARPC History, Jul 69-Jun 70, 184-186; ARPC History, Jul 70-Jun 71, 88-110.

<sup>40</sup>The Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program. A History with Recommendation, Lt Col Arden J. Johnson, ARPC, Aug 71.

<sup>41</sup>Analysis of Air Force Reserve Individual Training Program Study, ARPC, 18 Jan 72, 3.

<sup>42</sup>ARPC History, Jul 71-Jun 72, 65; ARPC History, Jul 70-Jun 71, 96-100; Background Paper, Single Manager, ARPC/HO, no date; Historical Report, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (ARPC), 1 Oct-31 Dec 72 with attachment of Ltr, HQ USAF/JA to Air Force Judge Advocate General Area Representatives, JAGAR Program, no date, one attachment of Fact Sheet on Transfer of IMA Judge Advocates to ARPC.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Memo to All MAJCOMs/HC/DP/XP, HQ USAF/HC, the USAF Reserve Chaplain Program, 19 Jul 72; Memo Routing Slip, ARPC/HC from AF/HCP, 5 Sep 72 with attachment, Air Force Reserve Management Structure Study, Chaplain Function; Proposed MA Regulation, no date; Memo from HQ USAF/HCP to AF/PRMM, Transfer of Chaplain IMA UDL Authorizations, 2 Mar 72.

<sup>45</sup>SG Quarterly Historical Report for 1 Jul 72-31 Mar 73, 1 May 73; ARPC Medical History, 1 Apr-30 Jun 73; Memo to All MAJCOMs/SG/DP/XP from USAF/CC, Medical Mobilization Augmentee Program, 6 Jun 73.

<sup>46</sup>ARPC/HO for ARPC/MO, Background Information on ARPC's Air Reserve Squadrons, 2-3.

<sup>47</sup>ARPC History, Jul 73-Jun 74, 23-25; ARPC History, Jul 74-Jun 75, 65; ARPCR 23-21, Organization-Function Chart Book, ARPC, July 74, 13-17.

<sup>48</sup>ARPC History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 80, 37-40.

<sup>49</sup>Effective 1 April 1988, AFIS was redesignated the Air Force Intelligence Agency (AFIA), changing the foregoing office symbol accordingly, factbook (u), HQAFIA/HO, subj: Air Force Intelligence Reserve (AFIR), 1 May 88, 1-3, 1 attachment.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 1-3.

<sup>51</sup>ARPC History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 87, 27-30.

<sup>52</sup>ARPC History, Jul 74-Jun 75, 66.

<sup>53</sup>ARPC History, Jul 74-Jun 75, 66-67; Ltr, General David C. Jones to ALMAJCOM/CC, Revitalization of the Mobilization Augmentee Program in the Total Force, 12 Jun 75; Report, Air Force Reserve Mobilization Augmentees in the Total Force, no date.

<sup>54</sup>Warren, 45; ARPC Reg 23-21, ARPC Organization Function Chartbook, May 77, 12-15; 1977 ARPC History, 13-15.

<sup>55</sup>Warren and Cantwell, 37-39.

<sup>56</sup>ARPC History, 1 Jul-31 Dec 75, 33-35; Mobilization Augmentee Requisition System Implementation Plan, ARPC/DPRO, Sep 75; Talking Paper on the Status of the Mobilization Augmentee Requisition System (MARS), ARPC/DPRO, 6 Apr 76; Msg 282100Z Jan 76 ZEX, ARPC/DPRO to MAJCOMs, Mobilization Augmentee Requisition System, 28 Jan 76; Talking Paper on the Status of the Mobilization Augmentee Requisition System (MARS), ARPC/DPRO, 4 Mar 76.

<sup>57</sup>Study to Improve the Management of the USAFR Mobilization Augmentee Program, ARPC, 28 Mar 77; Major Air Command/Separate Operating Agency Mobilization Augmentee Program, ARPC/XP, Jul 77.

<sup>58</sup>ARPC Program Action Directive (PAD), ARPC/RTT, Centralized Management of Mobilization Augmentee Programs, 1978; Plan (DRAFT) Mobilization Augmentee Management Improvement System (MAMIS) Implementation Plan, no date.

<sup>59</sup>Memo, ARPC/CV (Walsh) to HQ USAF/RE (Maj Gen Lyon), Centralized Management of Mobilization Augmentee Program, 17 Mar 78; Briefing, Centralized Management of MAJCOM/SOA MA Program, 28 Nov 77; Ltr, ARPC/CV (Walsh) to All MAJCOMs/SOAs, Centralized Management of Mobilization Augmentee Program, 23 Jan 78.

<sup>60</sup>Memo, ARPC/CV (Walsh) to HQ USAF/RE, Centralized Management of Mobilization Augmentee Program, 17 Mar 78; Memo, ARPC/CV (Walsh) to MAJCOMs/SOAs, Centralized Mobilization Augmentee Management Workshop, 22 Mar 78; Memo, ARPC/CV to HQ USAF/RE, Centralized Management of Mobilization Augmentee Program, 18 Aug 78.

<sup>61</sup>TIG Report, Functional Management Inspection of the Air Force Mobilization Augmentee (MA) Program, PN78-643, 5 Sep 78-13 Aug 79.

<sup>62</sup>Warren and Cantwell, 41-43.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 42; Staff Summary Sheet, William R. Usher, Maj Gen, HQ USAF/MPXX, Functional Management Inspection of the Air Force Mobilization Augmentee (MA) Program, 28 Apr 80.

<sup>64</sup>1980 ARPC History, 35-37; ARPC History, 26-27.

<sup>65</sup>Final Report of Air Force Management Assistance Group (HQ AFMAG), 10 May 82; Memo, ARPC/XP to all Directorates, AFMAG Final Report, 21 May 82; Ltr, ARPC/CC to USAF/RE, no date, with ARPC responses to AFMAG; SSS, AF/IGR to AF/MP/RE/CVA, Air Force Management Assistance Group Report on the Air Force Reserve, 21 Jan 82; Ltr, USAF/LMPX to USAF/RE, Overall Policy Responsibility and Future Course of Action for the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program, 15 Nov 83; Cantwell, Gerald T. The Air Force Reserve: Flying Club to Total Force, Feb 89, 756-765.

<sup>66</sup>Final Report of AFMAG, 27; Cantwell, The Air Force Reserve: Flying Club to Total Force, 763; 1983 ARPC History, 1.

<sup>67</sup>Ltr and Final Report, AF/XO to AF/RE (General Gill), Review of IMA Program, Sep 83.

<sup>68</sup>Ltr, USAF/MPX to AF/RE, Overall Policy Responsibility and Future Course of Action for the Individual Mobilization Augmentee Program, 15 Nov 83.

<sup>69</sup>1987 ARPC History, 32-39.

<sup>70</sup>1988 ARPC History, 29-30; ARPC Reg 23-21, Organization Function Chart Book, Sep 88.

<sup>71</sup>1988 ARPC History, 27-30.

<sup>72</sup>AFR 28-3, 30 June 86, p 458.

<sup>73</sup>Report, ARPC/MA, Deployed IMAs by MAJCOM and DAFSC, 21 Aug 90.

<sup>74</sup>Report, 18 Jan 91, ARPC/MAP (Wanda Heath).

<sup>75</sup>Report, ARPC/MA, STOP/LOSS, 26 May 91; Report, ARPC/MA, Abbreviated List of Stop Loss AFSCs, 26 Mar 91.

<sup>76</sup>Report, ARPC/MA, Desert Storm--Ordered to Duty as of 5 Mar 91; Report, ARPC/MA, Report of Ordered by File/Component/AFSC, 5 Mar 91; Report, ARPC/MA, MAJCOM--On Duty Report, 5 Mar 91.

<sup>77</sup>Report, HQ ARPC/RC, Individual Reservists Ordered, Partial Mobilization, 10 May 91; Report, ARPC/RC, No. of Recalled IMAs by AFSC, 1 Aug 91.

<sup>78</sup>Reports, ARPC/DPAD, IMA Delay/Exemptions, dating from 15 Nov 90 to 11 Mar 91.

<sup>79</sup>AFR 28-5, USAF Mobilization Planning, chapter 2, para 2-8, p 16, 22 Feb 91.

<sup>80</sup>Special Study, ARPC/HO, The Air Reserve Records Center's Role in the Mobilization of Reserve Forces for the Berlin Crisis 1961, Jan 91, p 17.

<sup>81</sup>Report, ARPC/HO, IMA Survey General Summary of Responses, 29 May 91; Report, ARPC/HO, Commander/Supervisor Survey Summary of Responses, 3 Jun 91; Briefing, ARPC/HO, Desert Shield/Storm Survey Results, 21 Jun 91.

**APPENDIX 1**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION ASSIGNEE STRENGTHS (1959-1964)**

Program Element	1959		1960		1961		1962		1963		1964	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<b>PART I:</b>												
*MOARS (MB)	1,114	9	653	12	529	14	342	12	319	6	266	5
MOARS (MC)	5,947	838	5,088	985	4,762	1,225	2,225	1,372	2,441	1,819	2,990	2,317
MOARS (MD)	2,040	106	1,916	110	1,995	95	3,635	113	3,569	147	3,543	275
MOARS (ME)	167	59	165	1,406	177	1,796	133	532	121	303	116	245
MOARS (MS)	1,943	12,720	2,655	7,574	805	4,857	579	7,861	1,032	11,719	472	9,885
MOARS (MV)	----	2,630	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	(MF)	509	123
MOARS (MW)	----	225	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
MOARS (MX)	----	44	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
MOARS (MR)	----	----	186	59	412	277	428	299	447	343	439	428
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11,211</b>	<b>16,631</b>	<b>10,663</b>	<b>10,146</b>	<b>8,680</b>	<b>8,264</b>	<b>7,342</b>	<b>10,189</b>	<b>7,929</b>	<b>14,337</b>	<b>8,335</b>	<b>13,278</b>
<b>PART II:</b>												
MOARS (MF)	688	889	240	713	1	3	Part II positions abolished 1 Jul 61					
MOARS (MH)	450	148	188	74	-	1						
MOARS (MJ)	4,716	9,670	2,122	4,804	12	81						
MOARS (MK)	15	15	23	19	-	-						
MOARS (MT)	1,203	18,144	902	15,642	-	1						
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7,072</b>	<b>28,866</b>	<b>3,475</b>	<b>21,252</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>86</b>						
<b>PART III:</b>												
MOARS (MG)	2,115	1,061	2,250	1,285	222	69						
MOARS (MX)	1,039	157	1,312	222	182	11	747	6	1,445	7	1,312	8
MOARS (MM)	5,212	1,021	8,267	6,312	18,592	2,673	17,246	1,323	14,571	722	13,982	1,830
MOARS (MU)	3,237	49,450	1,898	29,457	1,820	23,391	71	1,681	4	9	----	----
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11,603</b>	<b>51,689</b>	<b>13,727</b>	<b>37,276</b>	<b>20,816</b>	<b>26,144</b>	<b>18,064</b>	<b>3,010</b>	<b>16,020</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>15,294</b>	<b>1,838</b>

\* MOARS (Mobilization Assignment Reserve Section) Individual Ready Reservists not assigned to a specific unit and trained as individuals were assigned to a Mobilization Assignment Reserve Section. Part I mobilization assignees were assigned to major commands and received their training from the assigned command. Part II individual reservists were assigned to major commands but received their training from the Air Reserve Centers of ConAC. Part III individual reservists were assigned to ConAC and received their training from ConAC's Air Reserve Centers.

**SOURCES:**

Statistical Data, Jan 60, ARRC HISTORY 1959, SD 10  
 ARRC Statistical Summary, Dec 1960, ARRC HISTORY 1960, SD 233  
 ARRC Statistical Summary, Dec 1961, ARRC HISTORY 1961, SD 96  
 ARRC Statistical Summary, Dec 1962, ARRC HISTORY 1962, SD 123  
 FACTS, Dec 1963, ARRC HISTORY 1963, SD 122  
 FACTS, Dec 1964, ARRC HISTORY 1964, SD 131



**APPENDIX 1 (cont'd)**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION ASSIGNEE STRENGTHS (1965-1967)**

Program Element	1965		1966		1967	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<b>PART I:</b>			<b>AUGMENTEES</b>		<b>AUGMENTEES</b>	
MOARS (MB)	194	-	204	7	281	15
MOARS (MC)	2,147	1,696	2,299	1,809	2,310	1,565
MOARS (MD)	2,693	322	2,078	209	1,914	166
MOARS (ME)	78	194	76	1,097	44	279
MOARS (MF)	466	91	408	64	441	54
MOARS (MR)	398	291	286	99	310	65
(MH)			655	27	597	28
*(MA)			227	-	264	-
*(AH)			249	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,976</b>	<b>2,594</b>	<b>6,482</b>	<b>3,312</b>	<b>6,161</b>	<b>2,172</b>
<b>PART III:</b>			<b>DESIGNEES</b>		<b>DESIGNEES</b>	
MOARS (MH)	30	2				
MOARS (MM)	12,843	1,256	11,025	1,081	9,761	892
MOARS (MX)	1,417	16	1,511	19	1,555	18
(MT)			1,619	198	1,651	88
**(RA)			7,294	124,841	6,879	118,312
**(RN)			87	3,545	73	3,435
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14,290</b>	<b>1,274</b>	<b>21,536</b>	<b>129,684</b>	<b>19,919</b>	<b>122,745</b>

\* In the FACTS, January 1967, RCS: ARPC-UI, the individual reservists were identified as Augmentees and Reinforcement Designees for the first time. Prior to this issue, they were referred to collectively as Part I, Part II, or Part III mobilization assignees. Reservists in Reserve Sections MA (MOB AUG - Selective Service Sq Aug A) and AH (MOB AUG - Navigator Training Sq NTS) were included in statistics for Augmentees.

\*\* Included as Reinforcement Designees, as well as Reserve Sections MM, MX, and MT), were Reserve Sections RA (ORS-more than 12 Mos EAD with rem MSO - DES - ORS-A) and RN (ORS-less than 12 Mos EAD with rem MSO - DES - ORS-N).

**SOURCES:**

FACTS, Dec 1965, 1965, SD 129

FACTS, Aug/Sep 66, and Jan 67, in Dec 66, SD 102

FACTS, Jan 68, in Dec 67, SD 87

**APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE/  
 REINFORCEMENT DESIGNEE STRENGTHS (1968-1970)**

Program Element	1968		1969		1970	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<b>AUGMENTEES:</b>						
MOARS (MA)	277	-	260	-	255	-
MOARS (MB)	210	9	189	5	133	7
MOARS (MC)	2,375	1,966	2,450	1,816	2,410	1,310
MOARS (MD)	1,728	142	1,699	150	1,574	132
MOARS (ME)	37	76	-	-	-	-
MOARS (MF)	457	56	158	23	122	17
MOARS (MH)	527	20	494	14	510	15
MOARS (MR)	308	61	298	53	137	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,919</b>	<b>2,330</b>	<b>5,548</b>	<b>2,061</b>	<b>5,141</b>	<b>1,490</b>
<b>DESIGNEES:</b>						
MOARS (MM)	7,893	823	5,195	678	3,964	560
MOARS (MT)	2,016	91	1,595	79	1,328	53
MOARS (MX)	2,462	38	2,541	78	2,300	78
MOARS (RA)	6,348	129,004	5,936	147,217	4,884	200,104
MOARS (RN)	65	3,000	150	4,451	248	5,877
MOARS (MQ)*	-	-	-	239	-	164
MOARS (MW)*	-	-	-	337	-	240
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18,784</b>	<b>132,956</b>	<b>15,417</b>	<b>153,079</b>	<b>12,724</b>	<b>207,076</b>

\*Reserve sections MQ (NPS Trainee [Delay]-4 Mos AD for Trng 0-135 days) and MW (NPS Trainee [Delay] more than 4 Mos AD - over 135 days) were included in Reinforcement Designee program effective 1 July 1969.

**SOURCES:**

FACTS, Jul 69, in Jul 68-Jun 69, SD 147

FACTS, Jan 70 and Jul 70, in Jul 69-Jun 70, SD 164 and 165

FACTS, Jul 71, in Jul 70-Jun 71, SD 2-73

**APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE/  
MANPOWER STRENGTHS (1971-1973\*)**

Command ASGD	1971				1972				1973			
	OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ENL
AAC	27	13	56	6	34	16	59	8	28	9	59	4
ADC	850	359	3,781	283	852	300	3,781	215	323	277	3,127	206
AFAFC	29	28	-	-	29	26	-	-	23	18	-	-
AFCS	169	104	424	52	190	116	524	90	163	101	522	63
AFLC	616	285	566	211	616	307	566	237	348	311	322	138
AFSC	1,229	636	2,286	152	1,181	623	2,019	140	928	852	1,532	277
ARPC**	39	35	2	2	40	39	2	1	945	784	191	46
ATC	83	55	7	-	85	64	7	2	60	31	35	1
AU	24	20	2	-	24	19	2	-	18	16	2	1
AFRES	547	192	11	8	547	244	16	12	524	173	12	9
HQCMD/USAF	2,225	1,548	821	261	1,852	1,541	725	282	1,373	1,629	507	295
MAC	363	370	443	30	393	298	443	27	307	266	432	28
PACAF	1,091	93	4,284	35	195	87	135	29	181	83	132	24
SAC	71	38	-	-	77	56	-	-	35	70	13	-
TAC	1,132	451	4,200	370	722	467	3,824	454	378	263	1,143	280
USAFA	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
USAFE	373	30	5,230	59	142	31	2,606	39	75	21	888	19
USSOUTHCOM	3	1	-	-	3	1	-	-	3	1	-	-
USAFSS	147	23	103	2	147	20	103	2	147	20	103	2
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>9,019</b>	<b>4,281</b>	<b>22,216</b>	<b>1,471</b>	<b>7,130</b>	<b>4,255</b>	<b>14,812</b>	<b>1,538</b>	<b>5,860</b>	<b>4,925</b>	<b>9,020</b>	<b>1,393</b>

\* As of 31 Dec 73

\*\* Includes single managed manning strengths. For a breakdown of single managed IMA strengths, see Table 4 in narrative.

**APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)  
USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE/  
MANPOWER STRENGTHS (1974-1976)**

Command ASGD	1974				1975				1976			
	OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ENL
AAC	14	7	17	3	7	5	8	-	7	4	8	-
ADC	232	193	2,020	141	222	169	863	122	222	195	863	304
AFAFC	18	18	-	-	16	14	-	-	16	11	-	-
AFCS	163	104	522	60	158	83	474	40	158	91	474	50
AFLC	221	153	216	73	220	163	216	41	220	167	216	51
AFSC	755	577	510	66	723	549	244	48	723	602	244	80
ARPC	1,982	1,534	920	342	4,870	2,774	1,541	413	4,870	3,039	1,541	364
ATC	63	37	35	1	63	48	35	4	63	43	35	8
AU	18	14	2	1	16	14	-	-	16	15	-	-
AFRES	478	185	12	108	349	331	10	8	349	326	10	8
HQCMD/USAF	1,261	1,480	603	255	926	6762	390	74	930	833	390	143
MAC	267	246	148	42	273	249	71	75	273	248	71	50
PACAF	161	84	128	18	87	68	19	14	87	54	19	9
SAC	4	4	-	-	4	3	-	-	4	3	-	-
TAC	284	215	929	238	97	84	743	123	97	54	743	109
USAFA	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-
USAFE	29	13	870	19	5	15	618	20	5	12	618	20
USSOUTHCOM	3	-	-	-	Not Available Since 1974				-	-	-	-
USAFSS	148	24	103	3	55	29	293	38	61	35	327	73
AFAA					157	129	10	4	157	142	10	4
AFDAA					18	30	4	4	18	12	4	5
AFIS		Not Available			588	343	272	103	588	448	272	196
AFISC		Before			3	2			3	3		
AFMPC		1975			11	9	1	1	11	9	1	1
OSI					175	154	305	107	175	166	305	148
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>6,102</b>	<b>4,888</b>	<b>7,035</b>	<b>1,370</b>	<b>9,044</b>	<b>6,028</b>	<b>6,117</b>	<b>1,239</b>	<b>9,054</b>	<b>6,513</b>	<b>6,151</b>	<b>1,623</b>

**APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE/  
MANPOWER STRENGTHS (1977-1982\*)**

Command ASGD	1977				1978				1979			
	OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ENL
AAC	7	4	8	-	7	4	8	-	6	4	-	-
ADC	220	171	881	263	220	166	860	271	213	169	627	285
AFAFC	16	14	-	-	16	15	-	-	16	16	-	-
AFCC	158	86	474	32	158	87	446	35	133	87	324	42
AFLC	207	159	216	55	318	175	1,034	82	499	326	853	266
AFSC	745	614	242	77	805	668	183	92	835	730	184	132
ARPC	4,726	2,964	1,545	347	4,736	2,952	1,576	394	4,047	3,095	820	446
ATC	67	56	35	17	68	58	132	36	77	76	140	32
AU	36	29	-	-	36	27	-	-	-	-	-	-
AFRES	350	312	10	9	349	237	10	9	357	349	10	18
HQCMD/USAF	987	803	363	135	1,083	910	458	178	479	843	17	168
MAC	336	289	77	83	332	382	80	48	292	262	65	46
PACAF	57	47	10	6	46	40	32	6	222	31	202	6
SAC	4	3	-	-	27	7	18	-	49	17	624	28
TAC	82	58	778	187	70	47	773	232	144	37	732	149
USAFA	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-
USAFE	14	8	313	18	5	6	296	31	5	5	293	63
USAFSS	96	51	409	105	147	67	525	136	185	86	563	199
AFAA	157	142	10	5	157	144	10	6	157	127	10	6
AFDAA	18	16	5	3	18	-	5	-	11	3	31	4
AFIS	691	588	344	209	654	641	381	224	960	634	511	230
AFISC	7	3	-	-	7	7	-	-	7	6	-	-
AFMPC	11	10	1	1	10	9	1	1	293	10	95	1
OSI	163	159	187	173	163	160	187	169	163	164	187	164
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>9,156</b>	<b>6,586</b>	<b>5,888</b>	<b>1,725</b>	<b>9,433</b>	<b>6,810</b>	<b>7,015</b>	<b>1,950</b>	<b>9,151</b>	<b>7,078</b>	<b>6,288</b>	<b>2,285</b>

\* Manning Statistics for 1980 - 1982 are unavailable

**APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE/  
MANPOWER STRENGTHS (1983-1985)**

Command ASGD	1983				1984				1985			
	OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
AAC	7	5	-	-	7	6	1	1	7	7	1	1
AFAFC	16	16	-	-	14	14	-	-	14	12	-	-
AFCC	105	81	420	99	90	82	350	108	90	81	350	80
AFLC	1,173	688	1,512	533	1,204	724	1,470	564	1,204	684	1,466	606
AFSC	1,172	890	706	358	1,311	954	687	470	1,311	995	687	452
ARPC	3,764	2,388	1,072	684	3,762	2,557	1,072	808	3,762	2,595	1,072	822
ATC	178	115	756	186	145	83	545	191	145	80	545	228
AU	-	-	-	-	35	28	24	12	36	28	24	14
AFRES	383	354	-	5	383	333	-	3	383	316	-	1
HQ USAF	534	388	21	9	536	393	21	10	536	394	21	11
MAC	346	282	149	41	388	286	345	49	376	259	356	63
PACAF	92	55	21	7	-	57	-	6	-	-	-	-
SAC	191	131	1,980	440	131	123	1,382	450	131	109	1,382	451
TAC	221	162	1,448	371	135	146	1,125	482	135	113	1,104	370
USAFA	1	-	15	1	1	-	12	2	1	-	12	5
USAFE	3	-	56	31	2	-	53	26	2	-	53	23
AFAA	58	48	1	2	33	31	1	1	33	11	1	-
ESC	245	156	1,046	425	231	175	1,037	461	231	181	1,037	479
AFIS	1,014	831	761	300	1,041	870	745	311	1,041	873	745	336
AFISC	5	4	-	-	5	2	-	-	5	2	-	-
AFMPC	11	10	1	1	5	10	-	1	5	9	-	1
OSI	164	158	187	192	175	157	244	195	175	166	271	214
AFSPACECOM	38	46	5	43	50	47	77	58	50	45	77	50
AFESC	15	6	10	1	15	11	10	1	15	14	10	2
AFSINC	27	25	6	4	27	26	6	4	27	24	6	4
1947ASC	7	6	-	-	8	7	-	-	8	7	-	-
USAFHRC	18	14	3	-	20	14	4	-	20	17	4	2
AFELM	273	231	18	10	466	252	91	12	513	319	130	28
ALC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	-	1
AFOSP	8	7	-	-	8	6	-	-	8	6	-	-
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>10,069</b>	<b>7,097</b>	<b>10,194</b>	<b>3,743</b>	<b>10,228</b>	<b>7,394</b>	<b>9,302</b>	<b>4,226</b>	<b>10,264</b>	<b>7,388</b>	<b>9,354</b>	<b>4,244</b>

**APPENDIX 1 (Cont'd)**  
**USAFR INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEE/  
MANPOWER STRENGTHS (1986-1989\*)**

Command ASGD	1986				1988				1989			
	OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL		OFF		ENL	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	FUND	ASGD	FUND	ASGD	FUND	ASGD	FUND	
AAC	6	5	2	2	5	4	5	5	5	4	9	5
AFAFC	14	13	-	-	12	12	-	-	12	13	-	-
AFCC	87	77	369	108	70	73	122	119	57	63	130	90
AFLC	1,125	732	1,549	673	1,047	877	897	815	1,035	897	909	789
AFSC	1,441	1,045	771	411	945	1,147	325	397	1,037	1,057	263	305
ARPC	3,971	2,621	1,292	783	2,403	2,521	823	536	2,430	2,414	783	714
ATC	174	84	1,087	288	129	118	523	511	150	121	540	487
AU	91	29	32	16	67	68	31	24	67	68	41	28
AFRES	440	322	252	1	222	217	-	-	223	176	-	-
HQ USAF	530	386	22	11	404	403	15	17	410	374	10	15
MAC	409	261	389	60	303	281	86	142	300	266	120	123
PACAF	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-
SAC	129	109	1,321	437	180	130	570	490	156	150	611	480
TAC	150	111	1,532	430	103	148	459	585	128	136	492	462
USAFA	3	1	9	7	3	2	17	6	2	2	19	12
USAFE	5	4	68	27	5	4	20	26	6	5	30	23
AFAA	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ESC	200	175	826	458	196	177	514	507	194	166	521	424
AFIS/AFIA	1,166	815	973	369	860	837	395	397	925	837	375	364
AFISC	2	2	-	-	2	1	-	-	2	2	-	-
AFMPC	6	8	-	1	7	7	-	-	7	7	-	-
OSI	173	166	287	258	100	170	271	257	100	165	271	227
AFSPACECOM	48	45	166	51	64	68	69	80	85	70	80	64
AFESC	17	13	4	2	16	14	4	3	16	15	4	3
AFSINC	30	23	6	4	22	25	6	5	30	22	6	6
USAFHRC	21	17	4	3	20	16	4	4	22	21	4	4
AFELM	454	378	139	45	275	456	15	75	553	489	9	69
AFOSP	8	7	-	-	8	7	-	-	8	7	-	-
AFCSA	3	3	-	-	3	3	-	-	3	-	-	-
IPC	9	6	-	-	9	8	-	-	11	10	-	-
1100RMG	7	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AFDW	-	-	-	-	12	12	7	2	13	15	13	3
AFCOMS	2	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	2	1	-	-
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>10,721</b>	<b>7,471</b>	<b>11,100</b>	<b>4,445</b>	<b>7,495</b>	<b>7,808</b>	<b>5,178</b>	<b>5,303</b>	<b>7,990</b>	<b>7,574</b>	<b>5,240</b>	<b>4,697</b>

\* Manning Statistics for 1987 can be found in Table Seven of the narrative.

## GLOSSARY

AAC	Alaskan Air Command
AAF	Army Air Forces
AAFBU(RT)	Army Air Force Base Unit for Reserve Training
ADC	Air Defense Command
AFA	Air Force Academy
AFAA	Air Force Audit Agency
AFAFC	Air Force Accounting and Finance Center
AFALO	Air Force Academy Liaison Officer program
AFB	Air Force base
AFCOMS	Air Force Commissary Service
AFCC	Air Force Communications Command (Previously AFCS)
AFCSA	Air Force Center for Study and Analyses
AFDAA	Air Force Data Automation Agency
AFDW	Air Force District of Washington
AFE	US Air Forces in Europe (later USAFE)
AFELM	Air Force Elements
AFESC	Air Force Engineering and Services Center
AFGWC	Air Force Global Weather Central service
AFIA	Air Force Intelligence Agency (Previously AFIS)
AFISA	Air Force Intelligence Support Agency (Previously AFIA)
AFISC	Air Force Inspection and Safety Center
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFMAG	Air Force Management Assistance Group
AFMPC	Air Force Military Personnel Center
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFOSP	Air Force Office of Security Police
AFRES	Headquarters Air Force Reserve
AF/RE	See USAF/RE (Chief of Air Force Reserve)
AFRRG	Air Force Reserve Recovery Group
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code, Air Force Systems Command
AFSINC	Air Force Service Information and News Center
AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
AFSPACECOM	Air Force Space Command



AFTOR	old acronym for AF/RE
ALC	Air Logistics Center
AMC	Air Materiel Command
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	area of responsibility
ARC	Air Reserve Center
ARMO	Air Reserve Management Officer
ARPAS	Air Reserve Pay and Allowance System
ARPC	Air Reserve Personnel Center
ARRC	Air Reserve Records Center
ASD	Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command
ATC	Air Training Command
ATOC	Air Terminal Operations Center
AU	Air University
BIMAA	Base Individual Mobilization Augmentee Administrator
CAPLO	Civil Air Patrol Liaison Officer Program
CD MOBDES	Civil Defense Mobilization Designee Program
CHAPAR	Chaplain Area Representative Program
ConAC	Continental Air Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CRAF	Civil air reserve fleet
CRPO	Consolidated Reserve Personnel Office
DAFSC	Duty Air Force Specialty Code
DCPA	Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
ESC	Electronic Security Command
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLIP	flight information product
FMI	functional management inspection
HQ USAF	Headquarters, United States Air Force
IDT	inactive tour of duty
IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
IPC	International Program Center
IRS	Ineligible Reserve Section

ISLRS	Inactive Status List Reserve Section
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JAGAR	Judge Advocate General Area Representative program
JUMPS	active duty pay system (Joint Uniform Military Pay System)
LOGAIR	AFLC cargo airline
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAJCOM	major command
MARP	Mobilization Augmentee Revitalization Program
MARS	Mobilization Augmentee Requisition System
MA(RSO)	Mobilization Augmentee Reserve Supplement Officer Program
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MOARS	Mobilization Assignment Reserve Section
MPA	military personnel appropriation
MPAT	Military patient administration team
NARS	Non-affiliated Reserve Section
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NCOIC	non-commissioned officer in charge
OCHAMPUS	Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services
ORS	obligated reserve section
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PL	public law
RRPS	Ready Reinforcement Personnel Section
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SOA	separate operating agency
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TO&E	table-of-organization and equipment (units)
US	United States
USAF/...	Office symbol with Headquarters United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe
USAFHRC	USAF Historical Research Center
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAF/RE	Chief of Air Force Reserve, office symbol
USSOUTHCOM	United States Air Force Southern Command

USAFSS	United States Air Force Security Service
USC	United States Code
USCENTAF	United States Central Command Air Forces
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VART	Volunteer Air Reserve Training
WPR	War Personnel Requirement

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